Bang the Tin Drum Slowly

Günter Grass has died, at the age of 87.

Not quite 30 years ago I read The Tin Drum (in the original).  Haven’t read it since, but the ol’ boy’s death suggests I might ought to re-read it.  I also saw the film version a number of years ago, but in all honesty I can’t say I recall much about the movie.

The Tin Drum is set in and around Danzig (as it then was), a city whose 20th Century past was, to put it mildly, troublous.  That part of Europe — where what had been Poland for centuries was finally partitioned out of existence in 1795 — had long been a mish-mash of ethnicities, and Danzig was no exception.  The novel begins before the war and ends after the war, in an insane asylum in what had by that time become West Germany.

Grass’ own life arc mirrored the turbulent history of his home town.  Born too late to serve in the Wehrmacht during its triumphant years, by the time he was subject to compulsory service the war had irretrievably turned against Germany.  His first, unsuccessful brush, with military service was when he attempted to volunteer for the U-boat service in 1944.  He was turned down, most likely because of his age (he’d just turned 17), thereby setting himself up to survive the war.  Had he been accepted for U-boat service there is a strong likelihood he would not have lived; of the 40,000-odd men who served aboard the boats, almost exactly 30,000 never came home.  By 1943 Germany had lost the Battle of the Atlantic.  In March, 1943, the Allies sunk over 40 U-boats in one month.  Doenitz withdrew them from the North Atlantic patrol after that and from then through the end they were hunted beasts; many boats didn’t even complete a single patrol before their destruction.

Shortly after being turned down for the U-boat service he was drafted into the Waffen-SS, where he served in an armored unit from February, 1945 until his wounding on April 20.  He was captured by the Americans (again a fortuitous circumstance: most of the Germans captured by the Soviets were sent to their deaths in the Gulag) and eventually released a year or so after the war.  By then Danzig had become Gdansk and the Poles, to whom it was turned over, had ejected all ethnic Germans (in fairness, the Soviets had ejected the Poles from the 150 or so miles of Poland that Stalin took as part of the post-war Great Carve-Up).  Grass fetched up in the Ruhr district, where for a time he worked in a mine and later did an apprentice as a stonemason.  He began writing in the 1950s; The Tin Drum was published in 1959.

For years he was a reliably left-wing voice, although he did speak against the most radical elements, at least in terms of their aim of immediate socialist revolution.

In 2006 the facts about his service in the Waffen-SS came to light.  In all his prior and very public statements he’d never mentioned it.  Not a few people took him to task for it, precisely because he had been such a prominent critic of Germany’s engagement with its Nazi past.  In truth he ought to have known better than to let something like that lie fallow for so long.  If he actually was drafted, and unless he did things in uniform he’d just as leave we didn’t know about, then there was no reason to have buried his past.  If anything you’d think it would have made him a more credible, more effective advocate for his public positions.

Was Grass a volunteer or a draftee?  I have no way of knowing whether any draft papers or other illuminating documents would have survived this long.  What did his unit do while he was on active service with it?  If it was on the Eastern Front it most likely spent most of its time getting shot to pieces by overwhelming Soviet forces.  But was it involved in massacring a few civilians on its way out of town?  I haven’t seen anything one way or the other.  You’d think that, given how Grass suppressed a biographical phase that the ordinary viewer would see as highly significant — one way or the other — someone would have taken the time to dig up the facts.  That is, after all, how Kurt Waldheim came to grief.  His unit was known to have been in the Balkans during his service and it was easily discovered what it had been up to during that period.  It didn’t bear the light of day very well.  [Aside: I still remember seeing Waldheim’s campaign posters from 1986 in Vienna, when he was running for president:  “An Austrian the World Trusts”.  Cue Inspector Clouseau:  Not any more.]  I may be entirely wrong:  That investigation may already have been undertaken and discovered that there’s a whole lot of absolutely nothing at all to see.  If that’s the case, however, then why did he bury his past so long?

Grass expressed some trepidation about German reunification, a sentiment in which he was hardly alone, either in the world at large or even within Germany itself.  Konrad Adenauer was far from the last German not entirely to trust his countrymen with their own power.  Among Americans, I still recall a professor of mine, who’d fought in the U.S. Army during the war, laconically observing that he got “a very peaceful feeling” when he contemplated the existence of a forcibly divided Germany.

Nonetheless, the collapse of the international communist experiment and the unwinding even of large aspects of the European social democracy model left Grass, like many on the left, casting about for some point of relevance.  In the U.S. we see the left-extremists clustering around two overall approaches to the problem:  The first is to embrace the descent into irrelevance, as with the “social justice,” “micro-aggression” would-be thought police.  The other is doubling down on the 1930s-vintage neo-communist expansion of the state, as with the EPA’s nascent attempt to regulate your back-yard hamburger grill.  In Europe it’s taken, and is taking, the form of collaborating in the Islamization of the continent, and its hand-maiden, hatred of Israel.

In April, 2012, Grass published “Was gesagt warden muß,” (“What must be said”) a so-called “prose poem” in which he takes issue with Germany’s delivery of a nuclear-capable submarine to Israel.  He claims to fear that Israel may assert a right to an alpha strike on Iran, in order to prevent its development of nuclear capability.  He asserts that a nuclear-capable Israel endangers a fragile world peace.  He claims to speak now, because he is tired of the hypocrisy of the West.  And so forth.  The piece is short; here’s a translation of it in The Guardian.  Read it all.

Left unsaid by Grass is any mention that of the two states he specifically names, one — Iran — has adopted for its formal policy the extermination of the other, its “wiping from the map,” and the killing of as many of its citizens as possible; the other — Israel —  for whom Iran has such sanguinary and explicit intentions, has adopted no such policy in respect of any other nation or people.  One of the two nations — Iran — at that time was, and remains today, a known sponsor of some of the most bloodthirsty islamo-fascist terror groups in the world, almost all of whom expressly address their violence against the United States and its interests.  The other is not a sponsor of international terrorist groups.  One of the two nations — Iran — hangs homosexuals from construction cranes, stones adulteresses to death, and regularly practices torture on its own population.  The other — Israel — does not.  One of the two nations — Iran — sentences Christians to prison or death for practicing or preaching their faith.  The other — Israel — has in its parliament political parties representing its minority ethnic populations.  One of the two states Grass mentions gives every reason to fear its possession of any weapon of mass destruction.  The other has never.  One state — Iran — has never been the object of an attack by its united neighbors with the intent of eradicating it.  The other — Israel — has repeatedly weathered these attacks.

There is no other way to characterize Grass’ point:  Iran and Israel are morally equivalent quantities.  The attack of either on the other would be equally worthy of condemnation.  The attack of either on the other is equally to be feared (although, you know, Israel has, you know, never actually, you know . . . attacked Iran).  The world, presumably, would be equally injured by the extinction of either.  The attack on Iran by an Israel fearful that the mullahs mean precisely what they say about wiping Israel from the map, and Germany’s having enabled any of that attack, would splash a further taint of guilt on an already guilty-ridden land which could never be washed clean.

At the risk of understatement:  I am profoundly uninterested in any person, in any ideology, in any theology which cannot tell any material difference between the Iran of the mullahs and Israel, the only functioning democracy in that entire area of the globe.

Maybe his poem was nothing more than a desperate grasp for relevance in a world in which his chosen politics has been refuted pretty thoroughly by the march of time.  Certainly his later bleat in favor of Greece, and how awful it is that the rest of Europe, and Germany in particular, are just being such meanie-pokers to decline to shovel sand down a rat hole indefinitely, argues in favor of that hypothesis.  Or maybe it could be something more sinister.  Maybe it has something to do with why Grass chose for some 60 years to cover up his service in the SS.

In any event, we have lost another anti-Western voice from the world’s babble.  Whatever his talents as a writer may have once been, he won’t be missed.

Der Himmel Lacht; die Erde Jubiliert

The heavens laugh; the earth rejoices.  The title of Bach’s Cantata No. 31.

The heavens must have been laughing on March 21, 1685, on which date, 330 years ago today, Johann Sebastian Bach was born into a family of very accomplished musicians in Eisenach, previously best known for being the town at the foot of the Wartburg, where Luther translated the Bible.

I know bugger all about the technical aspects of music.  I can’t play an instrument (although I once picked at the banjo).  So I can’t explain just why it is that for over 30 years now I’ve felt deeply moved by his music.  It’s a pleasure I get to enjoy pretty much all by myself, at least among my acquaintances.  Perhaps there are others of my acquaintance who guiltily slip off and let the mysteries of the C-minor Passacaglia wash over them, but if there are, they’ve managed to keep their identities a dark secret from me.

While I was in college, a small church just off campus put on an organ marathon on the tercentenary, March 21, 1985.  I packed by book bag as full as it would go, grabbed a thermos of coffee, and camped out for several hours, studying and listening to relays of organists put the instrument through its paces.  That summer I was in Germany and the local cathedral, which every summer has a weekly organ concert, performed everything Bach ever wrote for organ over the course of the season.  With a student identification it cost may $0.75 to get in, and man alive it was something to hear.

A few years ago the symphony near where I live put on the B-minor Mass (link is to an excerpt) which by way of gentle irony Bach himself never got to hear performed end-to-end in his lifetime.  By an even gentler irony the text is the Roman Catholic Latin mass (Bach composed it for an R.C. prince). I can’t think of anything in Italian, French, or English that Bach ever set to music.  Most of his choral/vocal works are in German (he never worked in any really cosmopolitan city, and the place of his longest tenure — Leipzig — was regarded as being thoroughly provincial).  He did some work in Latin, perhaps most memorably (other than the B-minor Mass) being his absolutely breath-taking Magnficat:

At my age I’m starting to think in terms of bucket list items.  Last month I got to go see a basketball game on Larry Bird’s home court.  I’ve seen Earl Scruggs play at the Ryman, and once, many many years ago I got to see Bill Monroe.  Arlo Guthrie I likewise checked off the list.  Recently I got to see the Wiener Sängerknaben on tour.  I’ve been to Bach’s “home” church, the Thomaskirche in Leipzig, but I do want to hear his choir, the Thomanerchor, perform (well . . . perhaps it’s not strictly speaking accurate to describe them as “his,” since they’d been around over 500 years before he became the director, but nonetheless he spent the final 25 or so years of his life as their director and ever since they’ve been keepers of the flame, so to speak, to the extent that The New York Times once described them as a “Bach re-enactment society,” which I thought was a bit tacky of them).  While not on tour they still sing two or more times a week at the church.

A further bucket list item is to hear Ludwig Güttler and his brass ensemble play.  I have a CD of him performing sundry Bach trumpet pieces with the Neues Bachisches Collegium Musicum and the Leipzig University choir, the disk ending with the final choral of the Christmas Oratorio, “Nun seid ihr wohl gerochen” — Now are you well avenged.  This stuff just puts me in a good mood, no matter how lousy a day it’s been.

At the risk of getting all morbid and all, among my regrets — irremediable, unfortunately — is that when it comes time to go to such eternal reward (for certain values of “reward,” of course) as is in store for me there will be no one and nothing around to play or perform those pieces which I’d most want to have played at my funeral.  Such as, for example, the last movement of Cantata No. 31 — “So fahr ich hin zu Jesu Christ” — “So I go to Jesus Christ.”  Or, even though the tune is well-known in the Anglo hymnary, “Nun danket alle Gott”:

Although most in the English-speaking world don’t seem to realize it, “Bist du bei mir” is actually a death-bed song; the narrator is singing to his love: “Be thou with me, so will I go joyfully to my dying.”  One of my favorite cultural uses of it is in “Joyeaux Noël,” the polyglot dramatization of the 1914 Christmas truce.  They don’t give the entire rendering, but among the most touching moments of the film is when the old couple whose house has been commandeered by the German Crown Prince for his headquarters can hear the protagonist couple singing for the high brass, and the old man wordlessly grasps his wife’s hand.

Lest Gentle Reader suppose I’m thinking of an all-Bach funeral, I’m not.  I have a disk of 18th Century Moravian Brethren music.  On it is “Lob Gott getrost mit singen,” (can’t think of any terribly good way to translate that title), which dates to 1544.  It’s now firmly established as part of the Lutheran tradition in Germany; the link is to an ordinary congregation singing the choral as part of their ordinary Sunday service.  And while we’re reaching back into the very early days of the Reformation and its music, I’d really, really like to have among the chorales sung “Allein Gott in der Höh’ sei Ehr” — “To God in the Highest Alone be Honor” — which, at pre-1525, has to be among the very earliest Protestant chorales.  They sang it at the re-consecration of the re-built Frauenkirche in Dresden (bonus Brer Güttler, who personally raised a boat-load of the money to build it, leading his ensemble):

Even if I can’t have my favorite hymns sung because they’re pretty much all in German, maybe I could have a competent organist?  Contrary to my wife’s assertion, organ music is emphatically NOT all gloom-and-doom.  As brief exhibits I refer to Triosonatas Nos. I, V, and VI.  Those can only be described as jolly.  Same for his transcription for organ of Vivaldi’s A-minor concerto (bonus: this recording is on the re-built Silbermann organ in the Hofkirche in Dresden, the pipes of which had fortuitously been removed for maintenance before the bombing).

Not that Bach’s organ works can’t be rich in dramatic tension and energy.  Here we’ve got another piece recorded on yet another of Johann Gottfried Silbermann’s organs:

In addition to his enormous outpouring of sacred music (some 200 of his cantatas survive, and that may not even be a complete muster of them), he spent a large amount of time exploring the “standard” forms of music in different keys and in different structures.  Perhaps his most thorough exposition is “The Art of the Fugue,” which has fugues in every major and minor key, and in nearly every combination of structure (“similar” motion, “contrary” motion, similar and contrary together, “inverted” motion, and so forth).  As an exercise book he put together the Two- and Three-Part Inventions for harpsichord.  No. 8 is among my favorites.  No. 13 was, for those of a certain age, the background music for the old Commodore 64 television commercials.

The didactic, sometimes nearly mathematical elements of Bach’s music make it particularly well-suited to electronic format.  I’m proud to say I’ve got both Walter Carlos’s Switched-on Bach albums on vinyl at the house.  On the first one he gave us the first movement from Brandenburg Concerto No. 3; on the second we got the complete Brandenburg No. 5.

I supposed I could go on.  But either one is a bit nutty about this or one is not.  De gustibus non disputandum est.  All I can say is Jauchzet Gott in allen Landen — praise God in all lands, that talent, inclination, and opportunity converged so magnificently in central Germany, beginning 330 years today.

 

Following in the Master’s Footsteps

Years ago, while studying in Germany, I ran across a reference to some interesting research that had been done by East German scholars.  What they’d done was go to London and try to replicate the research that Marx had done to produce Das Kapital, among his other words.  What they found was that Marx had pretty much gun-decked (as we say in the navy) the whole thing.  Falsified data, misrepresented the contents of sources, and so forth.  It’s stuck in my mind all these years because I couldn’t believe that the East Germans would have let these guys go to London for that purpose in the first place, and secondly that they’d have let the results leak out.

But it was even so.  I can no longer recall where I came across the reference to that research, and being 20 and stupid (and with way too much beer to drink) I was too indolent to go and run it down on my own and see what these scholars had actually reported.  Marx’s little honesty issues aren’t confined to German language reports any more.  Paul Johnson (whose magnificent The Birth of the Modern I’ve re-read probably north of a dozen times since I bought my copy in the summer of 1993) wrote a book, Intellectuals, in which he excoriates a good crop of the leftists’ sacred cows.  It’s been a while since I bought and read my copy (maybe I’ll re-read it, starting this afternoon), but as I recall he outlines not only Marx’s overall fraud, but mentions specific instances of it as well (e.g., Johnson quotes the actual words of sources which Marx intentionally and repeatedly mis-quoted).  And of course the actual behavior of dear ol’ thoroughly-bourgeois Marx to those around him, including the only proletarian that he actually had any meaningful contact with, comes in for some pretty stern treatment.

Suffice it to say that the entire marxist edifice rests on fraud and some pretty basic misunderstanding of the physicalities of producing goods and providing services in any group of people much larger than a stone-age band of hunter-gatherers.

All of which is by way of background to the uproar unfolding around this French marxist and his book.  His name, in case you’ve been in solitary confinement for several months, is Thomas Piketty.  He has written a book, Capital in the 21st Century, in which he concludes that (i) “unequal” concentration of wealth is inherently objectionable, and (ii) it is inherent in the nature of capitalism, as practiced nowadays, to exacerbate the unequal concentration of wealth in the hands of the wealthiest.  In support of that second conclusion he offers a mass of data, graphs, charts, and so forth.  As the left’s favorite mountebank, Paul Krugman, claims, “It’s true that Mr. Piketty and his colleagues have added a great deal of historical depth to our knowledge[.]”  Krugman admonishes us sloped-brow-bitter-gun-clingers, “[I]f you think you’ve found an obvious hole, empirical or logical, in Piketty, you’re very probably wrong. He’s done his homework!”

From Piketty’s conclusions he offers a number of suggestions for how to go about counteracting capitalism’s inherent tendencies towards objectionably disproportionate concentrations of wealth.  I say “disproportionate” because I do not understand that he argues for the complete abolition of capitalism, or (at least not in so many words) the introduction of socialism, which means that he must necessarily be willing to accept some disproportionate concentrations.  So must Krugman, by the way; I’ve yet to hear of his coming out in favor of expropriating George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg, Laurie David, Algore, or any of the other left-extremist billionaires who back him and his notions.

I’ll leave it to Gentle Reader to plow his way through Piketty’s book.  [Note:  In linking to the Amazon.com page for his book I violate one of my informal little rules on this blog.  Except in the rarest instances I don’t link to books I haven’t read myself.  Something as long as a book is generally too complex and too nuanced to comment about if you’ve not made the effort to read it, so unless I specifically observe otherwise, if you see a link to a book, you can assume I’ve read the thing, and generally more than once (if you would talk to a friend more than once, why wouldn’t you read a book more than once?).]

Piketty’s got only a little problem.  He’s not the only one who has done his homework.  Others have also done his homework, and what they’ve found about his presentation of his research is very much in keeping with the marxist antecedents of his thinking.  It turns out that Piketty’s had his hand in the data jar, and to more than a little extent.

What is it about left-extremists?  Why do they experience this compulsion to make things up?  To borrow a line from Krugman, “Why, it’s almost as if the facts are fundamentally not on their side.”  Projection, anyone?  I’m not foolish enough to come out and say that no author, scholar, or other person on the opposite side from the extreme left has ever fudged the numbers or even made them up wholesale.  But I’m not aware that any of The Giants on the side of human freedom — Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman come to mind — has ever been caught out just cobbling together bullshit out of thin air.  I’m not aware that anyone has revealed fraud from the skeptical side on the scale of the University of East Anglia, which claims to have “lost” its original data, and the e-mails from which include one from the fellow they hired to come in and fix their data.  After something like two-plus years he gave up, and made the statement (to them, by the way, and not publicly) that they had so thoroughly and so irrationally manipulated the data — just adding things and stripping them out, with no reason or pattern — that it was no longer mathematically possible to reproduce what the numbers had originally been.  For a good compendium of articles going all the way back to the original e-mail leak, I strongly recommend a search on Instapundit under “climategate.”  Or how about Marc Bellesiles, whose “research” on gun ownership in early America was so fraudulent that he not only got stripped of his Bancroft Prize, but actually was fired from his tenured faculty gig?  Or how about Steven Leavitt’s slander of John Lott?  Lott, Gentle Reader might recall, was the scholar who published a paper in which he correlated wider private ownership guns and looser personal-carry laws with a drop in violent crime.  Leavitt (most widely known for his Freakonomics) apparently made two claims about Lott: (i) that a specific paper of Lott’s was not peer-reviewed, and (ii) that Lott had hosted a symposium to discuss the issue but had not solicited contrary opinion to participate.  As reported at Chronicle of Higher Education:

“Mr. Lott’s lawsuit alleges that Mr. Levitt defamed him in a 2005 e-mail message to Mr. McCall (who, contrary to what was reported in an earlier version of this blog item, is not the same John McCall who once taught Mr. Lott at the University of California at Los Angeles). In that message, Mr. Levitt criticized Mr. Lott’s work as guest editor of a special 2001 issue of The Journal of Law and Economics that stemmed from a conference on gun issues held in 1999.

The letter of clarification, which was included in today’s filing, offers a doozy of a concession. In his 2005 message, Mr. Levitt told Mr. McCall that ‘it was not a peer-refereed edition of the Journal.’ But in his letter of clarification, Mr. Levitt writes: ‘I acknowledge that the articles that were published in the conference issue were reviewed by referees engaged by the editors of the JLE. In fact, I was one of the peer referees.’  Mr. Levitt’s letter also concedes that he had been invited to present a paper at the 1999 conference. (He did not do so.) That admission undermines his e-mail message’s statement that Mr. Lott had ‘put in only work that supported him.'”

You can quibble about the niceties of the second assertion; if only people whose work supported Lott submitted their work, then it would naturally follow that only “work that supported him” got “put in.”  You could make the same statement about a conference on the boiling temperature of water at sea level.  But the first concession?  Why didn’t Leavitt just come out and say, “I am a liar”?  Because that’s what he did; he made a material statement which he knew to be false when he made it; in fact, he had peculiar knowledge of its falseness.

What is it about these people?

Woodrow Wilson’s Long Shadow

So I recently finished reading Wilson, A. Scott Berg’s new biography of Woodrow Wilson – actually, Thomas Woodrow Wilson. It was a Christmas gift, along with Margaret MacMillan’s The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 and Scott Anderson’s Lawrence in Arabia (in the middle of reading which last I now am).

This book was only my third extensive exposure to the life and thought of a man who comes as near to American beatification by serious thinkers as any politician since Lincoln. FDR’s reputation rests more on what he actually accomplished than on his character traits. Kennedy is mostly a media creation. Wilson is, in common with Lincoln and Jefferson, revered for what are represented to be his thoughts. What those thoughts might be are commonly – and vaguely – understood to be very high-flown notions of the unity of all men, the need for collective security, and of course at the center of it all his Fourteen Points. 

The careful reader will notice that all of those hazily understood concepts have one thing in common: the Great War. Specifically, they’re all outgrowths of Wilson’s contemplation of Europe’s four-year suicide bid. Lincoln, by the time he got to the White House, had spent years engaging with slavery, abolitionism, and the political tensions those forces generated. His 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas remain among the classics of Western political discourse, and that senate campaign was far from his first debate. With one portentous exception, Jefferson’s most creative political thinking was several years in the past by the time he got there. Until August, 1914, however, Wilson had never had occasion to devote much energy at all to international affairs and certainly none to the implications of an entire culture immolating itself. He came to the office with the expressed intention of spending his efforts on purely domestic issues. 

A further point of distinction is not insignificant, I suggest. Jefferson and Lincoln both had the experience of years of head-to-head engagement with ideological foes and allies who saw themselves, and with whom Jefferson and Lincoln engaged, as peers. Their thinking benefitted from the crucible effect of, in Jefferson’s case, his exposure to an historically unique constellation of statesmen, and in Lincoln’s his experiences riding the circuit from county to county, arguing and debating with peers, juries, and the public. I could not tell from Berg’s biography that Wilson ever really engaged with the welter of thought around him. The life Berg describes is one spent lecturing (remember this was an era in which the public lecture was very popular entertainment among most levels of society). As a classroom teacher he grew accustomed to being acknowledged as a if not the fount of wisdom by his pupils. Except for one brief period in Georgia in which Wilson practiced law – if having a single probate case as one’s entire professional experience counts as “practiced” – he never really held a job outside academic circles and elective office. Combined with his ecclesiastical family background his formation as the layer-down-of-rules seems to have left an indelible mark on how his mind worked. 

And it doesn’t appear to have been just that. Even as a child Wilson was big on setting rules for others to follow. One example is given of a group of young boys, his peers, who got together for I no longer recall what, and Tommy (as he was known until his graduation from college) makes it among his first orders of business to promulgate a written constitution for the club. “Promulgate” seems to be precisely the correct verb, too; in all of Wilson there’s not a whiff of his even seeking input, let alone consensus from anyone. Contrast Lincoln circulating his first inaugural address in draft to several of his prospective cabinet members, or Jefferson working as part of a committee to draft the Declaration. If Americans had coats of arms, Ipse dixit would be on Wilson’s. 

Wilson was greatly enamored of both his wives. After his marriage to Ellen, to the extent he needed human interaction, he seems to have derived nearly all he required from her, and then within a few months after her death he was consumed with ardor for Edith. While that’s enviable in some respect, it is also not necessarily a desirable character trait in a political leader. Certainly his interactions with adults seem to break down into two overall groupings: (i) those who fawned on him as the Sage of New Jersey, and (ii) those to whom he laid down the rules. Even the two men with whom he was closest, Edward M. “Colonel” House and John Grier Hibben, a fellow junior faculty member at Princeton, do not seem to have broken the pattern, although perhaps of all men Hibben came closest. 

In short, I get the profound impression that Wilson’s life experiences did not sufficiently expose him to the friction and concussion of dealing with men he regarded or had to regard as his equals. 

Largely if not entirely without actual adult friends, it’s hard to get a sense that Wilson ever had the daily experience of emotional closeness to another person whose ideas were not die-stamped by his own or just parroted back in hopes of a good grade. In all of Berg’s book I don’t recall a single instance of a peer acknowledged by Wilson as such telling him he was talking through his hat and kindly leave off gibbering. Predictably, he does not seem to have accepted the notion that reasonable men could disagree with him in good faith and were entitled to pursue their own notions of what was necessary or proper in any particular circumstance. When he was appointed president of Princeton he was treated as walking on water and parting it for those who couldn’t. That’s always a dangerous brew to serve to anyone and especially to someone whose resistance to it seems to have been roughly similar to the resistance to alcohol on display by the Indians in Betty McDonald’s The Egg and I. When the inevitable disagreements occurred, there was never any question of collectively making the decision and everyone living with the outcome cheerfully. 

The most dramatic instance of this (apart from the fight over the Versailles treaty) involved, as does so much else in academic settings, a tempest in a teapot. Wilson believed the off-campus clubs were fostering a spirit of elitism at Princeton. He believed they were exclusionary of the less-affluent students, the less-socially-gifted ones. So he set out to undermine them by denying them a recruiting pool. Wilson’s notion was to build large, self-contained student living facilities, what we today know as quadrangles. There the underclassmen would be obliged to live with each other, their company not self-selected but chosen for them by whatever mechanism the university chose to adopt from time to time. Hardly surprisingly this idea did not meet universal approval, and some intense politicking went on. Eventually Wilson couldn’t carry the issue. Hibben, by that time senior faculty, sided with Wilson’s opponents. Wilson never addressed another personal word to him for the rest of his life, and even in the White House tackily avoided meeting the man whom he had once described in almost amatory terms. 

How Wilson treated Hibben over what was, after all, a relatively trivial issue and one which was not a decision that could never be re-visited (there was no reason the trustees couldn’t decide at some later point to go ahead and build quadrangles and implement Wilson’s vision for them in whole or in part) demonstrates what I’m going to say was a deep character flaw in Wilson. His enmity was not at all feigned; when he had occasion to allude to Hibben in later years (nearly always elliptically, it seems) he never backed off from the accusation of betrayal. 

Compare and contrast Wilson’s treatment of Hibben with the relationship that grew between Jefferson and Adams. True, it took a number of years after both men were out of office, but once rekindled their friendship produced hundreds of letters and thousands of words over the course of many years. They wrote each other about nearly everything and although they still disagreed on many things, by the time they died, on the same day and within hours of each other, each died with the other’s name on his lips. And Jefferson had run the original dirty, slanderous campaign which destroyed Adams’s political career. Not that Adams wasn’t as prickly as they come, but he’d been a farmer, a courtroom lawyer, and a diplomat for decades before he came to office. Each and all of those provided him with the experience of contradiction, frustration, and engagement with fundamentally opposed and well-defended principles.

Wilson thought House got above himself at the Paris Conference in 1919. He wasn’t entirely unjustified, either. For several weeks Wilson had to come back to the U.S. to attend to matters for which the president was indispensable. While Wilson was gone House had very consciously made deals that he must have known Wilson would never have countenanced if present. Recall that House had no official position, at all; the White House porter was more a government official than he. House was only in Paris as Wilson’s alter ego; the actual secretary of state, Robert Lansing, was side-lined, treated as a cipher, a nullity. So while House must bear the blame for having exceeded his phantom remit, it was Wilson who put him in the position of being able to do so in the first place. Had Wilson not been so adamant on denying any scope to the feller who was, you know, the lawful official to discharge that function, Lloyd George and Clemenceau would have no more listened to Edward House than they would Wilson’s barber. Whatever the who-shot-Johns of the matter, the fact remains that after their return to America Wilson never addressed another word to House. 

After Wilson left the White House, his long-time aide, Joseph P. Tumulty, was scrambling to find some hand-hold. The country had swung wildly Republican in the 1920 elections. The Congress was solid Republican and Harding’s White House was dedicated to undoing as many of Wilson’s policies as it could. Tumulty had been with Wilson since his nomination to the New Jersey governor’s mansion ten-plus years before. He’d been loyal, self-sacrificing, incredibly hard-working, discreet – in short, everything you could possibly want in a confidential secretary. And now he was out of work and out of favor in the only town he knew how to navigate. Wilson wouldn’t lift a finger to help him, and when Tumulty finally went too far, publicly attributing to Wilson statements that Wilson had pointedly refused to make at Tumulty’s request, Wilson cut him out of his life. Yes, what Tumulty did was wrong, but how much a strain on common decency is it to see to it that the people who have sacrificed their existences and fortunes to advance your own are taken care of, once you no longer have need of their services? Fairness, however, requires that I mention two other prominent personages who are known to have sinned in this regard, viz. Churchill and Wm. J. Clinton. Churchill never obliged people to commit crimes and take the fall for him, as did the latter, but once Winston was done with you, you were pretty much done with (for a better look at this disappointing aspect of him, see Troublesome Young Men, Lynne Olson’s book about the small number of men who clustered about Churchill during his Wilderness years . . . which of course makes his treatment of them all the more unworthy). 

There are very few words that adequately describe someone who treats people like Wilson treated them. “Vicious” is one that will fit the bill. 

A good deal of Wilson is naturally devoted to the war years and their aftermath, and a central part of that period was Wilson’s growing dedication to the notion of what we now call “collective security.” At the Paris Conference he more or less insisted that adoption of the League of Nations and its incorporation into the final treaty itself (as opposed to making it a side bargain) be the first order of business. He carried that point; the League was adopted pretty much as he’d demanded it be. From that point things didn’t really go his way very well. 

Over the decades Wilson’s taken a good drubbing as some starry-eyed naïf, a little boy in short pants who blunders into a lion’s den with the idea that if they’ll all just take turns licking on his lollipop everyone will do just fine. There is a bit of truth in that. Wilson represented – very simplified – the notion of peace without victory. The problem was, the situation on the ground, both on the former battlefields and behind doors in the chancelleries, just would not admit of that resolution. Every one of the belligerents was a parliamentary democracy, and two of them – Italy and France – were notoriously unstable democracies at that. Even Britain was still operating with its makeshift wartime coalition (how cohesive could a government be that had both Lloyd George and Lord Curzon in it, after all?). Bluntly, they had to answer to their voters, and those voters had just watched most of an entire generation of young men be slaughtered, maimed, gassed, and shell-shocked into twitching bags of nerves. Two of the Allies, France and Belgium, had endured physical destruction on a scale never before seen in human history. Wilson doesn’t seem to have accepted that those populations were just not going to be satisfied with not having won the war. 

On the other hand, and in Wilson’s defense, the objectives of Lloyd George and Clemenceau were no less unrealistic. In a fight, you haven’t won until the other guy acknowledges you’ve won; until then the fight is still on, even though you might not actually be trading punches. The way the Great War came to a close, with an armistice instead of a surrender, with the German army marching home in formation and under arms, and with the social power structures – for which read: the pervasive dominance of the military – still intact, whatever the outcome was, Germany was not in a position of being compelled to acknowledge defeat. And it didn’t. We all know how the poisonous “stab-in-the-back” conspiracy theory came to be seized on in later years, first by the army and then by the Nazis. On a more immediate level, though, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were trying to impose the kind of peace that you would achieve after an unconditional surrender. In a supreme irony, “peace without victory” is not just what Wilson was advocating – it was exactly what Britain and France got. Which is to say that they got neither victory nor peace. 

On a final note of irony, given the personality of the man – remember how he treated Hibben, the closest he ever had to a friend other than his wives – how would Wilson have fared if the U.S. had ratified the Versailles Treaty and joined the League? He couldn’t bear contradiction or defiance. Wilson couldn’t take it when the Princeton trustees wouldn’t let him build residential quadrangles, fer cryin’ out loud. How would he have reacted to the post-war chaos in Eastern Europe? Would he have quit communicating with his fellow heads of state? Would he have recalled the American representative to the League? Would he have taken the U.S. right back out the first time the steeped-in-gore-up-to-the-shoulders politicians of Europe heard one of his sermons and either laughed in his face or gave him the Bronx cheer? How would he have dealt with the Imperial Japanese delegates, men representing a society both incomparably more ancient than Wilson’s own and at the same time aggressively expansionist? 

I understand that in writing a one-volume biography of someone who lived a life such as Wilson’s there’s a tremendous amount that you’re simply not going to get in. So I don’t say this by way of faulting Berg (what I do fault him for are his not-terribly-subtle digs at one end of the modern partisan spectrum, such as by pointing out that Wilson played more golf while in office than any president before or since, or his reference to the second Iraq war), but one thing I looked forward to reading more about were Wilson’s ideas about government, the relationship between the citizen and the state, and the nature and proper purposes of political power. 

Because you see, there are some dissenting voices, even here in America. Not everyone agrees that Wilson was Solomon reincarnate, a veritable saint of equal parts brilliance and compassion. A few years ago I read Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism, his 2007 tome on the intellectual roots and modern manifestations of the ideas which gave us most famously Mussolini and Hitler. The book’s dated, however, by including a great deal of material on the intellectual antecedents and pronouncements of one Hillary Rodham Clinton, who back then was “inevitably” going to be the 2008 Democrat nominee. Don’t get me wrong: Goldberg’s done his work on Clinton’s intellectual and moral background, and what he lays out is pretty sobering stuff. But unless she’s nominated and elected in 2016 those portions of the book will not age very well. 

For me the by-far most interesting part of Goldberg’s book is Chapter 3, “Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of Liberal Fascism.” You see, before Wilson was appointed president of Princeton, he was a prolific writer on political subjects; in fact, he’s got a good claim to be godfather of “political science” as a specifically academic subject. Among his most famous works is an 800-page doorstop entitled The State. As a graduate student at Johns Hopkins he produced Congressional Government. Other significant works include Constitutional Government in the United States. Wilson also wrote numerous essays, and his speeches were, in the fashion of the times, compiled into book form. Among the former Goldberg mentions “Leaders of Men,” an 1890 effort, and among the latter The New Freedom, consisting of his 1912 campaign speeches. I’d wanted to see some significant time spent by Berg on those writings, because Goldberg actually quotes from them and from Wilson’s speeches. What he quotes is, to put it mildly, unsettling. 

“No doubt a lot of nonsense has been talked about the inalienable rights of the individual, and a great deal that was mere vague sentiment and pleasing speculation has been put forward as a fundamental principle.” Compare and contrast: Independence, Declaration of. 

The constitutional structures of what we know as checks and balances among the three branches among which coercive power is divided had “proven mischievous just to the extent to which they have succeeded in establishing themselves as realities.” 

“[L]iving political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and in practice. Society is a living organism and must obey the laws of Life . . . it must develop. . . . [A]ll that progressives ask or demand is permission – in an era when ‘development,’ ‘evolution,’ is the scientific word – to interpret the Constitution according to the Darwinian principle.” Substitute the German völkisch for Darwinian and you’ve got the “national” part of “national socialism” in a nutshell. 

The “true leader” uses the masses “like tools,” Goldberg quotes. Further, from the same source (“Leaders of Men”): “Only a very gross substance of concrete conception can make any impression on the minds of the masses. They must get their ideas very absolutely put, and are much readier to receive a half truth which they can promptly understand than a whole truth which has too many sides to be seen all at once. The competent leader of men cares little for the internal niceties of other people’s characters; he cares much – everything – for the external uses to which they may be put.” Oh dear; that sounds distressingly like a first cousin to Hitler’s große Lüge – the “big lie.” It also stands in a straight line with “fake-but-true,” the mantra of the modern American legacy media. 

From a speech given in New York during the 1912 campaign, we have, “You know that it was Jefferson who said that the best government is that which does as little governing as possible . . . . But that time is passed. America is not now and cannot in the future be a place for unrestricted individual enterprise.” Tell that to Steve Jobs. Hell, tell that to Oprah Winfrey, for that matter. 

Except for that last one I cannot recall seeing any of those quotations mentioned in Wilson. Goldberg’s endnotes suggest a wide range of further reading on the subject. Not having the time to parse through all of them myself (or maybe not; many are still available on Amazon.com), I was hoping that Berg would do the heavy lifting for me. He didn’t. Again, as the author he’s got to leave something out or he’d never finish the book. On the other hand he does spend a great deal of space on Wilson’s moralistic approach to his political thought. And of course Wilson made his name first as precisely a political theorist. The last line of Berg’s book refers to “the lengthening shadow of Woodrow Wilson” over Washington, DC. It’s exactly because I think Berg’s got that observation just right that I find his omissions in respect of Wilson’s expressions of theory to be especially unfortunate. 

Maybe it’s time for me to mich auseinandersetzen (that wonderful German reflexive verb for which I can’t think of an English equivalent; transliterated it means “to take oneself apart,” and it means to engage in a subject or person fully, by completely unpacking all the components and examining them in the closest detail) with Wilson’s actual writings. Notwithstanding our present Dear Leader’s self-description, no one has come to high office a blank slate. Each person’s road there formed how he or she thought about the world, how it works, how it ought to work, and what measures are necessary or permissible to make it conform to one’s own vision. Wilson was no different. 

My very last semester in college I took one of the most interesting courses I’ve ever taken at any level. History 366 it was, “20th Century American Wars as a Personal and Social Experience.” Two observations by the professor I still remember. The first was that, until the Great War, most Americans’ only exposure to the federal government was in the form of their local post office. The second was that a huge number of the men who made the New Deal cut their teeth in the World War I mobilization effort. Jonah Goldberg makes the argument – which if perhaps a tad overdone isn’t so by much – that World War I was America’s first taste of totalitarian government. 

By “totalitarian” Goldberg means a frame of thought and action which does not view any aspect of human existence as not being appropriately the subject of political (and therefore coercive) control. The war years were years in which Americans were encouraged and recruited to spy on each other. The post office was given carte blanche to monitor and censor Americans’ communications with each other. Loyalty oaths were imposed. Industrial relations were controlled, as were entire swathes of the economy (the railroads were outright seized for the duration). You can make a valid argument that most of those measures were in fact necessary in order to take an economy from peacetime to war mobilization in a matter of months.

The point is that men such as Wilson – “Progressives,” they called themselves – viewed the mobilization effort not as a temporary disruption of an otherwise largely unguided constellation of private arrangements, but as a template for human existence. Remember Wilson’s comments from 1912, well before the war, about how America cannot any longer be a place of unrestricted (highly important word selection there, by the way) individual enterprise. A good deal of the wormwood of the 1920s for the American left was watching the policies of the Wilson years get unwound, first by Harding out of corruption, and then by Coolidge out of principle. You can’t more clearly draw the contrast between Wilson and Coolidge than Silent Cal’s speech on the Declaration’s sesquicentennial (which should be mandatory reading in every American high school, I suggest).

Compare Wilson’s statements on the need for a völkisch Darwinian interpretation of the Constitution and the “nonsense” of inalienable rights with Coolidge’s observations of the same questions, in the context of the Declaration:

“About the Declaration there is a finality that is exceedingly restful. It is often asserted that the world has made a great deal of progress since 1776, that we have had new thoughts and new experiences which have given us a great advance over the people of that day, and that we may therefore very well discard their conclusions for something more modern. But that reasoning can not be applied to this great charter. If all men are created equal, that is final. If they are endowed with inalienable rights, that is final. If governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, that is final. No advance, no progress can be made beyond these propositions. If anyone wishes to deny their truth or their soundness, the only direction in which he can proceed historically is not forward, but backward toward the time when there was no equality, no rights of the individual, no rule of the people. Those who wish to proceed in that direction can not lay claim to progress. They are reactionary. Their ideas are not more modern, but more ancient, than those of the Revolutionary fathers.”

This has turned out to be a bit more than just a book review. I’ve spent more time on other’s treatments of Berg’s subject than is properly done as a general rule. It wasn’t done to suggest that Berg’s written a poor book, but rather to observe that I wish his publisher had let him write a longer one. Berg does a very good job showing us the gauges and needles on the dashboard and how the windows silently slide up and down and where the heater vents are, but I wish he’d popped the hood a bit wider open for us, and shone a stronger drop-light into the engine compartment. I still highly recommend the book, to be read together with Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (speaking of Margaret MacMillan), and Chapter 3 of Liberal Fascism.

 

Chastised with Scorpions

Some weeks ago I ran across what was the beginnings of a book review, by Ta-Nehisi Coates in The Atlantic. I say “beginnings” because as he says, he only made it (listening in MP3 format) partway through one of the early chapters before he had to stop. As strong a stomach for portrayals of evil as he claims to have, he confesses himself revolted beyond endurance.

The book is Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder’s 2010 history of a particular part of Europe during a very special period in its history. The “bloodlands” Snyder describes consist of the western rim of the Soviet Union (with reference to its pre-1945 borders), Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This part of the world, largely cut off from the consciousness of the rest of the Western understanding first by war and societal collapse, then by revolution and civil war, then by war again, and finally by the Iron Curtain, got to experience its very own special kind of hell from the late 1920s to the late 1940s. During twelve of those roughly 20 years both Hitler and Stalin were in power, and both turned their blood-soaked attentions to it. 

Until comparatively recently few in Western Europe and fewer in the United States have known more than the bare outlines of what happened in the bloodlands, and even since the Soviet collapse the act of memory remains burdened by the purpose of memory, by which is largely meant the political purpose of memory. In terms of Getting the Story Out there were just too many people who had every reason to un-make the history. The only Western Europeans with any sort of broad personal exposure to what happened there – the Germans, both military, quasi-military, and civilians (even women civilians) – were understandably reluctant to call attention to what they did and saw in the bloodlands. The communists were likewise perpetrators on a grand scale, and thus for decades the white-washing of communist crimes by the Western intellectual elite confined their understanding of Stalin’s crimes to his purge of the Party in 1937-38 (Solzhenitsyn deals extensively with the myopia of the True Believers, as he calls them; for them the other millions of victims of the Great Terror just didn’t – and to this day don’t – pop up on the screen).  It’s not just the perps who have re-purposed the era, either. Even among the populations from whom the victims came, the martyr cult has been forced into a nationalist understanding of what happened and why. 

Just what did happen? The book opens with scenes from the destruction of the kulaks and the collectivization of Soviet agriculture. First came the “destruction of the kulaks as a class.”  And who was a kulak?  Anyone we say.  If you have two cows: you’re a kulak.  If your family has carefully tended its field for decades so that you produce more than the vodka-soaked farmer down the lane: you’re a kulak.  If you loaned a neighbor a few rubles to put a crop in this year: you’re a kulak.  A good proxy expression for “kulak” is “successful peasant.”  That’s important, because in the Russian village no less than anywhere else, it’s the successful to whom people look for leadership.  Those “kulaks” were not only in themselves objectionable from a class standpoint, they were also points around which resistance to Stalin’s further plans might coalesce. 

The “kulaks” thus had to be destroyed.  There were so many “kulaks” that it wasn’t even possible to shoot them all.  So what Stalin did was swoop down and pack the able-bodied men off to camps, then come back and sweep up the now-defenseless women and children to become “special settlers.”  Understand that these “special settlements” consisted of shoving the dispossessed farmers out of a train somewhere in Siberia, in a strange climate, with neither cattle nor seed corn nor farming tools, and telling them to (in an old white trash expression) “root hog or die.”  Hundreds of thousand did exactly that: die of cold, of starvation, of desperation.

Collectivization seems to have been an orthodox communist ideological policy of Stalin’s. He’s allowed Lenin’s New Economic Policy to run as far as he was going to, and dammit now we were going to embrace communism. That collectivization directly breached the Bolsheviks’ promise to the peasantry of land reform was immaterial. As Snyder points out in several places, the practice of “dialectics,” which in plain English means “the truth is what I say it is at this moment, without prejudice to my ability to declare its opposite ten minutes from now,” is a key to understanding the minds of the Soviet (and leftist in general) leadership.  So the remaining peasants were run off their land, by raw physical coercion or regulatory suppression (such as by denying permission to purchase seed), and forced into an agricultural factory (sorry, lefties, but “agri-business” is not an invention of Monsanto or Archer Daniels Midland).

While collectivization of agriculture was a Soviet-wide policy, there was more at play in the Ukraine than just a turn away from the Right Deviationists and a lunge towards Socialism in One Country.  The Ukraine was not only the Soviet Union’s breadbasket but also the home of Russia’s traditional belligerent cousins. If collectivization was going to succeed, and if the “national question” was to be solved, then the Ukraine had to be subdued. Conveniently this also meshed with the economic needs of the Soviets, as grain and lumber were about all they had (at that time; the phenomenal mineral riches of Siberia had yet to be tapped extensively, although the Kolyma was beginning its flowering into a byword for brutality and hopelessness) that anyone was interested in buying. And so the grain expropriations came. And came. And came. The “law of seven-eighths” (so nicknamed, as Solzhenitsyn reminds us, because of its promulgation on August 7) which criminalized possession of as little as an ear of corn, a moldy potato, or a handful of oats, sent tens of thousands to the Gulag. But more simply died. Stalin shut the peasants in the countryside, closing off the cities and denying the internal passports or the right to buy train tickets which would have been necessary for the peasants to go where there was food. Starving peasants who somehow managed to sneak their way to the cities were, if they survived long enough, shoved back onto trains and shipped right back to the howling wilderness of the countryside. 

By the simple expedients of taking all the food that was grown there and preventing the inhabitants from leaving, Stalin managed very intentionally to starve to death somewhere between 3 and 7 million Ukrainians — the numbers are all over the map — Snyder gives (working from memory here, so forgive me) something like 3.4 million; others, e.g. Robert Conquest, give much higher numbers) in about two years. The terror famine is now known as the Holodomor, and the Russian refusal to acknowledge it remains a sore spot to this day.  Walter Duranty, the NYT’s man in Russia, white-washed it for Western audiences and was rewarded with a Pulitzer, which the NYT has yet to disown.

De-kulakization, collectivization, and the Holodomor were just the start, however. By the late 1930s the Great Terror was in full swing. This is the Stalinist interlude that communists and their Western fellow travelers understand principally as the period during which the Party ate its own. And in truth the Party elites did manage to get thinned out. But even then the thinning was . . . mighty selective. Before it started, for example, the NKVD’s senior leadership was about a third Jewish. By the end it was less than 4% Jewish. And its other non-Russians had mysteriously gone away (for example, the Latvians had been a principal recruiting pool for the early Cheka). Don’t feel too badly for them, though; many of these chappies had zealously played their parts in the grain requisitions from the Ukrainian peasants.

It wasn’t just the Jews who attracted Stalin’s attentions during the purges. He was famously paranoid, and among his most ingrained fears was that of the national minorities. Here his personal demons intersected with communist doctrine.  The proletariat has no nation, no homeland.  Therefore in the dictatorship of the proletariat there can be no nationalities.  Those pesky Central Asian nomadic peoples are just going to have to give up their herds and settle down where the Great Helmsman chooses to put them.  [It’s impossible not to see some parallels between Soviet policy and the American reservation system for its aboriginal tribes.  Of course, in America the individual tribesmen were not compelled to remain with the tribe and settle.  While the tribes as tribes were confined to their reservations, on those reservations they were not forbidden to follow their ancestral ways (disregarding that the buffalo that was the foundation of those ways was nearly exterminated), nor were the tribes as social units extinguished.  Nor was the reservations’ produce expropriated and the people left to make shift.  So there are important substantive differences as well; however, honesty says we must still recognize the similarities.] The Soviet Union was home not only to the Ukrainians but also millions of ethnic Poles, Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Kazakhs, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and multiple others. Most of them lived in areas of the Soviet Union that were uncomfortably close to their “homelands,” at least by Stalin’s reckoning. And so he began to address the situation. Some he simply deported as a group, as with the Crimean Tatars, who within the space of a couple of days were shoved into trains and banished to interior. But how do you pack up an ethnic minority the size of Soviet Poles? You can’t. What you can do is shoot as many of them as you figure out a reason to, especially if they’re the kind of people who might be looked up to or take a leadership role among their fellows. Snyder points out that the ethnic minorities of the bloodlands were many times more likely than either ethnic Russians or Soviet citizens overall to die in an executioner’s cellar.

For several years by this point Hitler had been in power and devoting a great deal of thought to what he wanted to accomplish, and where. The over-arching scheme was set forth in the Generalplan Ost, the general plan of transforming the broad Eastern European lands into a land of German agricultural colonists. That those lands were already the homes of several million non-Germans didn’t matter. Some would have to be killed outright, some moved out of the way, some dragooned and worked to death, but many more simply starved. For nearly seven years, though, Hitler couldn’t lay hands on his victims.  And then came the war.

I’ve commented elsewhere on the collusion between Hitler and Stalin in carving up Poland and the Baltic republics.  The dialectics (q.v.) of the situation compelled the Western left to swallow its anger and grief, at least for nearly two years.  During that time the Angel of Death came to visit Poland and the Baltics . . . and settled down, hung up some prints and re-arranged the furniture. 

Where to start?  To the east of the Molotov-Ribbentropp Line, the Soviets set out to decapitate Polish society.  If you were educated, or wealthy, or a priest, or influential, or owned a business, or were an officer, teacher, policeman, professor, scientist, lawyer, prosperous farmer, engineer . . . etc., you were herded up and either deported or more commonly simply shot.  If you survived the shootings you might well yet end up crammed into a frozen cattle car to be deported to the wasteland of the Central Asian steppes.  The Katyn Forest massacre of the 14,000-odd Polish officers is just the best-known small part of a much larger story, one which the Western allies diligently suppressed even when presented with incontrovertible proof of it.  Janusz Bardach’s wonderful Man is Wolf to Man, his memoir of Gulag survival, starts with his experiencing the Soviet occupation of his native Poland.  In the Baltic Republics, Stalin was doing much the same thing: shoot everyone around whom society might coalesce, deport as many of the others as you can herd into the cattle cars, and call it a day.

Meanwhile, over on the other side of the line, Hitler was following a very similar course, although at the outset he wasn’t nearly as organized about it as Stalin.  Uncle Joe had many years and millions more corpses’ experience under his belt, you see.

Then came Barbarossa, the so-close-but-yet-so-far failure to knock the Soviet Union out of the war.  The Germans were taking hundreds of thousands of prisoners at a time.  They had no intention of feeding them at the expense of their own troops, who were told to live off the land.  And so they just herded the Soviet prisoners of war (other than the political officers, who were shot out of hand) behind barbed wire and left them to die of hunger in the open weather.  Millions died this way just in the first months of the war.

Right behind the front came the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatskommandos, roving groups of murderers who’d march entire villages into the woods and machine gun them over open pits.  The Jews of course were prime targets, and it was contemporaneously with Barbarossa that the truly massive-scale killing of Jews really got going.  One thing that I had not previously understood is that the mechanism of killing was different depending on which side of the Molotov-Ribbentropp Line one was.  East of the line the majority of killing was done by gunfire, either retail, with one shot per victim, or wholesale with machine guns hosing down lines of people.  West of the line was the more, errrmmm, technical side of things, with gas vans and gas chambers of various designs.

Everyone has heard of the Wannsee Conference, the meeting in early 1942 at which the “Final Solution” of liquidating the Jews as such was resolved as the, well, final “solution” to the “Jewish problem in Europe,” as the Nazis phrased it to themselves.  And when Westerners hear the expression “Final Solution” they think of Auschwitz. 

Snyder pays meticulous attention, however, not just to raw numbers killed but which groups were killed where, how, and in what order.  Auschwitz started as a slave-labor facility.  Granted, no one paid much attention to whether the slaves died of hunger or over-work, and so it was a tremendously lethal place from the start.  But it wasn’t until fairly late in the process that the famous gas chambers were built at Auschwitz-Birkenau.  Even then the arriving train-loads went through “selection,” with the able-bodied sent to be worked/starved to death and the balance herded into the chambers.  So it never lost its industrial character.  But (and I confess I hadn’t known this until reading the book) it was principally Jews from outside the bloodlands who were sent to Auschwitz, well over half the total.  And Roma and Sinti.  And non-Jews from the occupied territories.  All in much smaller numbers, of course; over 90% of Auschwitz’s victims were Jews, and it accounted for about one-sixth of the total Holocaust victims.  And Auschwitz’s peak killing didn’t occur until beginning in 1944, by which time the Germans had been nearly completely run out of the Soviet Union and much of the rest of what they’d conquered.  As Snyder points out, by 1944, something like three-quarters of the Jews who would eventually die in the Holocaust had already been killed.

The Jews of the bloodlands were exterminated much closer to home.  As mentioned, east of the Molotov-Ribbentropp line, the predominating method was shooting, which seems to have occurred in the very near proximity to the places of residence.  West of the line the Nazis built special purpose facilities with gas chambers fueled (if that’s the right expression) by carbon monoxide, usually generated by captured Soviet tank engines.  Another thing about the special facilities was that they weren’t “camps” in any meaningful sense of the word, because all they did was kill, unlike Auschwitz.  There were some bunk houses for the prisoners staffing them, but that involved a tiny number of people.  “Operation Reinhard” was the name bestowed on the operations of these places, and their names remain largely unfamiliar in Western society:  Treblinka, Sobibor, Chelmno, Majdanek, Belzec.  They were set up, their target populations were exterminated, and then the Germans did their level best to destroy every trace of them.

A further point of distinction:  As Snyder points out, roughly 100,000 people survived Auschwitz.  Of the Jews who saw the inside of an Operation Reinhard facility, fewer than 100 are known to have survived.

But all those are technical points, so to speak.  One thing which Snyder properly does is remind the reader that it’s somehow dehumanizing to speak of so-and-so-many “millions of victims.”  What we must remember is that to say that there were roughly 5.7-6 million Jewish victims of the Germans is to say that there were 5.7 million times one victims.  For each of the dead was not just a component number but rather a distinct point of humanity.  The woman who suckled her infant as she waited to be shot at Babi Yar was not a statistic; she was a mother, a daughter, a wife, a friend.  She had once had hopes and dreams.  She knew the ecstasy of creation and the pain of childbirth.  And they gunned her down, together with her child.

Snyder has good chapters on both the Warsaw Ghetto uprising and the physical destruction of the city itself.  And also some good material on how the post-war Polish communists did their level best to erase the specifically Jewish experience of the war from both.  In the service of nationalism.

And since the dying in the bloodlands didn’t stop with the guns, Snyder covers the ethnic cleansings that went on for another two years.  While not expressly exterminatory in intent, several hundred thousand people died in the course of creating ethnically homogenous national states.

Why the viciousness?  Some of it can be attributed to nothing more complicated than that the bloodlands were caught between two monsters.  There is a reason, after all, that more police officers die responding to domestic disputes than any other risk situation.  Hitler and Stalin both wanted those areas and they wanted them for very specific purposes, neither of which was compatible with survival of the societies who happened to live there.  But Snyder also points out two processes that played out, in slightly different patterns and at different times, on both sides.  Neither Stalin’s mass murder nor Hitler’s began as it ended up being. 

Stalin began by decapitating the rural population in preparation for collectivization.  He followed up with suppression of a long-time problem population.  But over time his blood-lust transferred itself to the national minorities as such, as (in his mind, at least) bearers of threats to Russia’s (and Russians’) political dominance in the Soviet Union and its border neighbors.  His paranoia required an object to focus on, and it found those objects in the Ukrainians, the Poles, the Baltic peoples, the Kazakhs, the Tatars, the Volga Germans, and so forth.  Their destructions, either physically or by wrenching separation from their homelands, became an end in itself (because of course not a damned one of them actually posed any threat whatsoever to the Soviet Union or Stalin’s rule).

Hitler’s extermination of the Jews in similar fashion transformed itself from something which was ancillary to the conquest of the Soviet Union and Lebensraum into a war aim as such.  Originally it was just part of de-populating the areas to be colonized once the war was won.  The Slavs were likewise to die, but they were to be starved/worked to death.  By December, 1941, so Snyder, it was apparent to the German high command that the war wasn’t going to be won.  Let’s see:  We went to war to conquer Lebensraum, and that isn’t going to happen.  We cannot say that we have failed in our war objectives, though; too many telegrams to mom back home about how her little Heinz had the honor to die for the Führer.  Thus:  The war is now about the smashing of Jewish domination of Europe.  This of course dovetailed nicely with the fact that all the other options to “solving” the “Jewish problem in Europe” that had been explored had played out and were no longer physically possible.

I will say that the least satisfying parts of Snyder’s book (once you’ve struggled through all the descriptions of the killing; I defy a parent to read of the killing of mothers and children without wanting to vomit) is the final chapter on comparison and comprehension.  I’m not sure that comparison of Stalin and Hitler is terribly useful.  It’s not like we’re running some cadaver sweepstakes here and in any event both Stalin and Hitler put together pale in comparison with the 45-60 million dead Chinese that Mao racked up in the Great Leap Forward . . . in four short years.  Comprehension and memory likewise both come up as not-quite-dead-ends.  There are multiple, partially-overlapping groups who died in their millions.  Each has a legitimate claim on the special aspect of what happened to them.  But for God’s sake!  They’re DEAD.  They’re all dead.  Each one of those victims is no more and no less dead than any other.  Each was no more and no less human.  Each one’s death is a gaping, suppurating wound of justice that heaven alone can remedy.

And can you even claim to understand What Happened?  Sure, you can punch through the archives, you can assemble pictures, documents, film footage, and so forth.  You can compile data.  You can, in some places at least, go see where it happened.  But we today have no more ability to stand at the edge of the ravine at Babi Yar than we do to fly a kite in Jupiter’s Great Red Spot.  And it is in those moments when the bullets were slamming into that mother and her infant; when the little Ukrainian boy who imagined that he saw food and kept proclaiming, “Now we will live!” until one day he didn’t; when Tania in besieged Leningrad noted the deaths by starvation of her entire family until, “Only Tania is left,” and then she wasn’t either; when the Polish officer, writing in his last moments of life about his wedding ring, heard the click of the pistol as it was cocked behind his ear:  In those moments It Happened, and we are forever shut off from them.

If we cannot know, cannot understand, then we can at least defy forgetfulness.  Snyder’s book tells a story that all of us have a duty to hear.  So we can Not-Forget.  And we can mourn.  We can examine our own souls and hearts, and forever ask ourselves whether we harbor within us the death of humanity that starved, shot, gassed, beat, and burned the bloodlands for nearly twenty long years.  In this respect I would suggest that Ta-Nehisi Coates has it exactly backwards when he closes his piece with the observation that it’s chaos “out there” and always has been.  That “out there” springs from “in here,” and the only place that any of us has mastery of is our own individual “in here.”

What if Everything You Thought About Yourself is Wrong?

So there is yet another book about the Watergate break-in, cover-up, and leak of same.  Leak: Why Mark Felt Became Deep Throat, by Max Holland, hit the shelves last March.  In it he explores the intriguing question of the title:  Why does a high-level official — No. 2 at the FBI, in fact — set out to destroy a president?

I haven’t read the book, I’ll admit, but the premise of the book matches with what came out several years ago when Felt was finally outed as Deep Throat, Woodward’s and Bernstein’s anonymous source.  More to the point, it seems that Felt, so far from being some sort of quasi-mole for civil rights within the FBI, courageously sacrificing all to put a stop to a presidential administration gone rogue at the very highest levels, was actually an ambition-soaked bureaucrat looking to advance his own career and destroy those of his competitors.  In other words, just a human like everyone else.  The nasty monkey-shines he exposed — break-ins, unauthorized wiretaps, and the like — were in fact nothing more than what he’d personally green-lighted himself in other cases.  Destroying a president and grievously wounding the presidency itself was just collateral damage for Mark Felt.

 What interests me more than the question of why Felt did it is the little matter of how Woodward and Bernstein fit into Felt’s plans.  In plain English, they got used in an attempted palace coup.  Did they know they were being used?  It’s hard to think they wouldn’t have.  You can’t work as a reporter in Washington for any length of time and not understand that nothing at all is entirely what it seems.

Generations of would-be “journalists” have grown up since the 1970s, and for them W & B have been lodestars.  Everyone is looking for the next Watergate story, every source is to be the next Deep Throat.  The image of the crusading journalist bringing down not just the high and the mighty — by, say, exposing a corrupt paving contract down at the street department — but crashing the highest and the mightiest in the world, is part of the mental landscape which today’s journalists carry with them.  The Fourth Estate is to be the guardian of all our liberties, reining in the megalomaniacal entrenched power elites, and so forth and so on.  Those are the stars which today’s budding J-schoolers bring with them in their eyes.

What if that’s not how it is at all?  What if reporters willingly make themselves tools of power factions?  What if they’re nothing more morally exalted than the same tribe who set up a flagrantly partisan — and almost comically fact-divorced — press from the days of Jefferson’s war against Adams, or Jackson’s wars against his sundry opponents?  What if the “truth” they peddle is no more than what is deigned to be shared with them by the hand of the chess-master who is moving them about a board, his board?  What if, in other words, the press has become no more than rent-seekers, attempting to glean a living — and power and influence to go with it — from the chips that fall when the powerful clash? 

Yes, there was a “story” in what Mark Felt had to tell Woodward and Bernstein.  But it was a “story” that was, in all truth, about as penny-ante as they get.  A politician’s aides had a shadowy group of operatives try to get the dirt on his opponents.  They decided to accomplish this by breaking in to someone’s office and sifting through files.  Woo-hoo!!  And it’s not like the fruits of the break-in did or would have influenced the drubbing that Nixon administered to McGovern in 1972 in any event.  There was no way, unless Nixon had been caught with the live boy or dead girl of the proverbs, that we would ever have had a President McGovern.  Or to put it in context, Harry Truman (as related in David McCullough’s biography) was petrified that someone would insinuate a female into his presence and then a photographer would pop out from behind a potted plant to snap a picture to wreck Truman.  And in fact on at least one occasion related in the book it appears that such very nearly happened.  That was how politics was practiced at that level.  In other words, the Watergate break-in, and even the subsequent cover-up, just weren’t in and of themselves big stories.  They were made Big Stories in a collaborative effort by two reporters and an ambitious careerist, working together in the fertile soil of one of the most cordially despised politicians (even before he got caught up in it) in American history.

The fact is that dragging out into broad daylight what high-stakes politicians have doubtless been engaged in since time immemorial (it was scarcely precedent-setting when that boob went sifting through Sarah Palin’s garbage and rented a house looking over into the family’s back yard) has forever damaged the institution of the American presidency.  Everyone who has been hopelessly smitten with love must know that, as a purely physiological proposition, there are some things which the Adored must periodically attend to.  We don’t need, in other words, Jonathan Swift to remind us that Celia shits.  Woodward and Bernstein rubbed our collective noses in that fact, though, and they did it as the subservient creatures of Mark Felt.

 The recent devolution of the American press into a more-or-less open cheerleading section for a particular faction of a specific party is all of a piece with the history of Woodward, Bernstein, and Felt.  And it’s not just domestic coverage (or increasingly, non-coverage), either.  It’s things like CNN admitting — after the fact, of course — that it went soft on Saddam Hussein in order not to jeopardize its “access” to his murderous regime.  The present White House now demands review and approval authority for quotations.  And today’s press meekly grants it.  JournoList gets together behind the scenes and coordinates what will and will not be covered, and how the stories that are covered will be.  The modern news industry is quite simply thoroughly corrupt, whether out of ideological grounds or the simple desire for fame, wealth, and power.

Whenever the point is made of the corruption of the modern press, the Watergate Story is trotted out as the Reason We Need a Free Press.  That’s the narrative.  A couple of intrepid reporters stand athwart the path of the government juggernaut.  That’s why we need to await breathlessly the next Film at 11 from whatever talking head flickers across our screens.  That’s why we need to wade through the 75% of the NYT that’s advertising.  That’s why we ought not make up our minds until we’ve been told how to make them up.  Remember Watergate!

Except it turns out the narrative is bogus.

And if This Doesn’t Cheer You Up

Andrew Klavan over at PJ Media has a thoughtful piece prompted by the sight of the reinauguration as president of the fellow who may be the most viciously anti-American, anti-Western, grossly in-over-his-head demagogue in public life.  The man’s political instincts are — proudly, and self-proclaimed — straight from the gutters of Chicago, a place that’s become a metaphor.  Back in the mid-1800s, they raised, physically raised, the city by about four feet in order to get it out of the slime of the lake-side swamp where it had been built.  They may as well have saved themselves the effort.  We as a nation have now twice wished that man, who has enthusiastically embraced the Chicago ethos, on ourselves as our leader.

Klavan — correctly, as I would suggest — sees the explanation for Dear Leader’s comfortable win after a campaign that strenuously avoided any discussion of his actual performance in office not in the usual analysing-the-horse-race of the television talking heads, but in something deeper, something much less comforting.  He sees it in human nature itself, and more particularly in the nearly universal craving for personal validation.  I’m good.  I want what’s right.  I am virtuous because I want what is virtuous.  These are ur-motives of modern human existence. 

Klavan spins his ruminations on this drive for validation in the context of thinking about a new(ish) play, The Party Line, written by PJ Media’s Roger L. Simon and his wife, Sheryl Longin.  [Note:  I haven’t read the play.  Yet.]  The play is an interwoven tale of two stories, both taken from events which actually happened.  The first is Walter Duranty, Stalin’s lick-spittle, whose cover-up of the Holodomor earned him a Pulitzer which The New York Times still has not repudiated.  The second is of Pim Fortuyn, who had the poor manners to point out the implications of the Religion of Peace permeating Dutch society, and was assassinated for his troubles.  Both of those stories and, just as important, the reaction of the people Thos. Sowell describes as the Deep Thinkers to them, are what gives Klavan pause.  The play, so Klavan, is about “the triumph of credo over truth, the ferocious commitment that decent, intelligent, educated people make to virtuous-sounding ideals and well-intended programs that are, in fact, the sure road to atrocity.”  He concludes:  “I’m embarrassed to say it, but in my youth I thought humanity stumbled slowly but surely toward the light of truth. Now I believe that we cling desperately, even violently, to the sense of our own virtue — and that the light of truth, which reveals us as we are, is our natural enemy. We would rather destroy the world than know ourselves.”

He’s right, of course.  We do cling violently to those things which we think make us virtuous.  The less effort and sacrifice it imposes on us, the more we like it.  This phenomenon is something of what Dietrich Bonhoeffer was getting at in his notion of “cheap grace,” grace which asks little from its claimant.  Some — including some of my near acquaintance — have taken this idea and from it derived a duty of Christians to embrace socialistic preferences in public policy.  I admit I have difficulty making all the dots in those arguments connect.  As near as I recall, the injunction was to give one’s own property to the poor and follow Jesus oneself, not plunder one’s neighbor and give his stuff away, and imprison or beggar one’s fellow citizens if they do not follow Jesus, all the while standing around in evening attire drinking expensive liquors, eating fine foods, and enjoying the frisson of superiority with one’s equals.  I also must admit I do not fully understand how Christianity can be not merely consonant with, but can actually make obligatory, policy choices which can be mathematically shown to increase misery, want, and encroachments on humanity’s moral agency which is the very essence of our nature’s as God’s children.

It is, you see, that moral agency which alone separates us from the beasts of the forest in any meaningful sense.  We are not the only creatures to use language (whales communicate over vast distances with aural methods).  We are not the only  ones who use tools (other primates do).  We are not the only ones who are socialized into intricate and closely bound organizations for our mutual benefit (most canids are, ditto lions, elephants, and other species).  We are not even the only ones which engage in warfare (chimpanzees and, if memory serves, bonobos as well do).  Now, it’s true that thanks to opposable thumbs we have very advanced fine motor skills across a whole range of activities, but in terms of the basic locomotions of existence, whether running, swimming, or flying, we are out-classed by enormous numbers of animals.  No.  What makes us as humans special among the beasts is our moral agency; we alone have the ability to choose between virtue and iniquity.

What makes marxism and socialism so monstrous is not the mere fact of the heaps of corpses which those ideologies have piled up in less than 100 years.  What makes them abominations is that in their determinism, both as an historical understanding of human history and as prescription for action, they negate the moral agency of the person.  I am not good or bad, my existence is not a blessing or a curse to my fellow men, based upon what I do but upon my “membership” in something they call a “class” the existence, extent, and characteristics of which is defined by something they describe as “production.”  I am not to be dealt with, either by my fellow citizens individually or by the state in which we exist, as an independent moral actor, attempting in the flawed way of human nature to discern the Truth, the Right, and act upon it in my daily existence.  No: I am to be allocated, slotted, constrained, confined within channels that others have chosen for me based upon what they determine — at the level of millions of individual humans — to be abstract “justice”.  This nirvana-like end-point of their thinking shows how sloppy it actually is.  Marxism and its milque-toast bastard daughter socialism proudly describe themselves as being objectively materialistic.  “Justice” is, however, not an external material state but an internal moral condition that is inherent, present or absent, in the human being and his conduct.  Justice is not something you have but rather something you do.

Klavan’s musings put me in mind of a film I saw a couple of years ago, Good.  The protagonist is a professor in 1930s Germany.  At the film’s beginning the Nazis have just come to power and, in the middle of a class, there is a disturbance outside.  He goes to the window and it’s the students piling up books to be burned.  If I recall the scene correctly, all his students but one, a drop-dead gorgeous girl, go streaming out to join in.  He’s horrified.

The rest of movie takes you through his evolution.  Of course he gets involved with the girl, and it’s she who, during a walk in the park, suggests that maybe they attend a function just to see what it’s like (or something of that nature; I’ve slept since I last saw the movie).  The professor also has a mother who’s in the advanced stages of senility and must be Dealt With; a book of his speculating on the subject of euthanasia is picked up on by the authorities and he’s invited into the orbit, so to speak.  Eventually he becomes what is spun as a “consultant” to the SS, which works out to be what you’d expect: about as independently affiliated as an “adjunct” member of the Gambino family.  At some point he protests (feebly) when someone identifies him as associated with the SS that he prefers to be known as a professor.  Ho-ho, the viewer is tempted to say.  And of course being a professor he starts the movie with a very learned, very successful Jewish friend.  By the end of the movie he’s looking for what happened to his friend, and all he can find is that he was deported to a specific camp on a particular date.

But that is, as they say, only the plot.  Several reviewers at IMDb.com take the movie to task for showing the supporting characters as being too one-dimensional, too wooden, too stock.  I suggest that the subject of the movie is the progressive degradation of one specific man’s soul from righteous outrage to willing if unthinking bureaucrat drudge pushing papers into files, across desks, into drawers, heedless of the fact that it’s people he’s destroying.  It’s not about the character development of the others; in the universe of the movie they are not loci of action but functional devices.  The girl is of course a siren, a beautiful woman who softly purrs into Our Hero’s ear that, oh come on, it can’t hurt just to look.  The Jewish friend is not just A Friend; he’s the human face of a catastrophe.  He’s the face, the voice, the soul, the human connectedness which the protagonist must abandon on his journey into savagery.  The professor does try to help his friend Get Out; even fraudulently buys him train tickets to leave.  Of course it doesn’t help and the friend is swept up in a pogrom; it’s the professor’s new wife who’s ratted him out. 

The professor lamely tries to hold onto his identity as such, and both his interlocutor and the viewer know it’s much, much too late in the game for that.  One of the reviewers at IMDb specifically mentions that line, but doesn’t give it the dramatic weight it deserves.  You have to understand that “professor” in Germany means something quite a bit more than “I teach at a post-secondary institution.”  This is a culture in which “professor” is not just an academic but a social rank as well.  When greeting a senior academic and a junior academic in each other’s company, do not dare address the elder and the younger both as “Herr Professor”; that would be perceived as grossly insulting.  The elder is “Herr Professor Doktor,” and the younger would be simply “Herr Doktor.”  If writing to someone who has doctorates in multiple areas (not at all uncommon in Germany), one would address the envelope to “Herr Professor Dr. Dr. So-and-So.”  Thus it’s extremely significant when the Good Professor vainly tries to clutch on to his pre-Nazi identity.  You understand that his boat has long since pulled away from the pier, and there is no way back.  The poor sod doesn’t get it himself until the last scene in the movie.

 What Good is about is the ease with which we humans adapt ourselves to, internalize, what is convenient, what is aggrandizing to us, what we are told is Truth and The Right, rather than what we know to be true.  The professor starts the movie understanding the repugnance of the Nazis; he knows it without engaging in any complex critical exercise.  By the end he’s just one more cog in a machine that grinds out dead bodies at a rate unmatched anywhere outside Stalin’s domains.  And each step of the way there was someone with him to usher him onwards, someone to pat him on the back, someone to compliment him on his learning and erudition.

So Andrew Klavan is, I’m afraid, terribly, awfully, depressingly right.  The worst of it is that I’m not sure that, having climbed down we as a polity can ever rise again.  It’s much easier, after all, to blow up a building than it is to erect it.  At 10:00 p.m. on February 13, 1945, the Frauenkirche in Dresden was one of the architectural treasures of Europe.  Thirty-six hours later it was a very tall pile of smoking rubble, and so it stayed for 45 years.  Having embraced a principle of social and political organization that panders to the most corrosive instincts of the human soul, can we truly expect the broad mass of humanity to turn away from it?  Can we un-ring that bell?

P. G. Wodehouse, Clairvoyant

Not only was P. G. Wodehouse the accomplished master of the English language, at least among 20th Century practitioners, but it appears that he was also clairvoyant. In re-reading (for the however-many time it is . . . my copy is getting pretty ratty around the edges) A Prefect’s Uncle, first published in 1903, Wodehouse sets up, and then spikes, the entire cryptic-pretentious edifice of late 20th Century poetry in particular and English-language literature in general.

It’s important to remember in this context that at the time Wodehouse was writing, poetry, its composition, publication, and public recitation, was taken seriously in England. Promising poets were widely and highly regarded, moved in Society, and among the educated the ability to compose half-way respectable verse was taken if not for granted then certainly to be something one was expected to be able to do. Poetry was publicly recited and was listened to, seriously, by its listeners. People expected the Poet Laureate to weigh in with appropriate verse on important occasions (this expectation was not universally met; some of the poets’ offerings were ghastly treacly throw-away lines). 

Nowadays? Well, poetry now seems to be all of a mish-mash of grievance bleats, attempts at disgusting one’s readers (and who listens to this trash, anyway, outside the irrelevance of a Humanities Department meeting? have they forgot that the original function of poetry was to perpetuate memory and transmit culture in a pre-literate world?), and neo-Stalinist celebrations of The Proletariat. If your skin, or your genitals, or your politics, varies in the least from the writer’s chances are you will be left with nothing at the end of the piece but that many more minutes of your life gone beyond recovery. I admit it’s more than a little like reading this blog, but then I’m not demanding that everyone and his cousin Stand in Awe of Me because of my courageous engagement on the subject of what I do for jollies behind closed doors, or how wonderful (or unfortunate) it is to look like me, or how wonderful the world would be if only everyone would turn over the fruits of his labors to me to dole out to my buddies. 

Wodehouse, in other words, could not be expected to have foreseen the sort of tripe which we now take for granted when someone mentions the subject of “poetry.” And yet, 110 years ago, he absolutely nailed the whole exercise in late 20th Century English-language literature. On the subject of the batting, in a cricket match, of his classmate named Pringle, a character tosses off a limerick: 

“A dashing young sportsman named Pringle,

On observing his duck (with a single), 

Observed with a smile,

 ‘Just notice my style, 

How science with vigour I mingle.’

‘Little thing of my own,’ he added, quoting England’s greatest librettist. ‘I call it “Heart Foam”. I shall not publish it.’”

 And there you have the entire ludicrous venture, in fewer than ten lines. “Heart Foam”? Priceless.

 

Maybe I Got a Bum Calendar

But on all the ones I can find hereabouts, what we can call the violent phase, or at least the publicly violent phase, of the Civil Rights Era didn’t really get going until the late 1950s and of course the early 1960s.  True, Emmett Till was murdered in 1955, and the Montgomery Bus Boycott was 1955-56.  Both of those events sparked enormous public interest and outrage.  Eisenhower sent the federal army to Little Rock in 1957.

So the author of this piece is partially correct that during the period she seems to focus on, 1950-63, the existence and enforcement of, and the struggle against, racial segregation was beginning to occupy a much greater bandwidth (sorry for the anachronistic use of the expression) in common American awareness than it had until that point.  Across Black America, of course, it had never not occupied stage center.  What with two world wars and a Great Depression sandwiched between them, however, most of the country outside the old Confederacy just had other problems to think about.  However poorly it speaks of human nature in general, when your own children are inadequately clothed for an Upper Midwest winter, you’re just not likely to spare a whole lot of energy thinking about the oppression of some child several hundred miles away.  As cruel as it may be to say it, but worrying about “social justice” is a luxury for societies who can feed, clothe, and house themselves.

On the other hand, Brown v. Board of Education (actually, it was the second round of that litigation that became famous) was a case from Topeka, Kansas.  Not exactly Spanish-moss Mississippi, in other words.  And that case wasn’t decided until 1954.

So there’s a bit of a problem with presenting the — I hesitate to call it “dominance,” but then I’ve never paid any attention to the beauty pageant scene, and I do understand that with the possible exception of a mafia turf war, it can be one of the more vicious venues of human interaction — of the old Confederacy as some sort of regional or even supra-regional conspiracy to whitewash the racial poisons of the place.  According to the author the run started in 1950, but by any reasonable standard the civil rights fireworks as something splashed across the news on a nearly daily basis would not have begun until the latter half of the decade at the earliest.  The Freedom Riders came in 1961.  Medgar Evers was murdered in 1963.  The Selma-to-Montgomery march was in 1960.  Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner were murdered in 1964.  The 16th Street Baptist Church was bombed in 1963.  Wikipedia has a pretty comprehensive time line of the civil rights era, and looking at it you can see that while things were by no measure quiet during the 1950s, they didn’t really begin to hot up until the later part of the decade.

In short, the time frames for the two developments this author wants to correlate just don’t match up.  Post hoc ergo propter hoc may be a hoary logical fallacy, but pre hoc ergo propter hoc is goofy.  And according to this article the Southern girls’ run pre-dated the mass consciousness of the Civil Rights Movement by a half-decade or more.  More to the point, time line or no time line, how do you present contestants from one-fifth of the pool winning fifty percent of the time as being a quasi-conspiracy of Southerners to gloss over events in the South without some pretty massive assistance from contest judges from around the country over the course of fourteen years?

And of course the run died out in 1963, which would have been shortly after the time things really started to get very publicly ugly.  To the extent that the effort behind seven Southern girls winning the Miss America crown in fourteen years was some sort of effort to distract public attention from what was going on in the South or as some kind of loopy compensatory behavior, it has to be counted one of the least successful P.R. efforts in history.

As stated, I’m probably the last person on earth who’s fully competent to opine on the dynamics of beauty pageants and what makes them go, but if I were looking for a plausible explanation of why girls from one specific part of the country did disproportionately well over a period of time, I’d refer the gentle reader back to Florence King’s Southern Ladies and Gentlemen, a book which, while hilarious as all get out and certainly more than a little tongue-in-cheek, still has a hard kernel of truth at its core.  And the world it describes strikes me as nearly a perfect petri dish for beauty contest champions as anything conceivable.  [Every time I read her (no doubt made-up) example of a wedding announcement garbled together with tobacco price quotations I nearly wet myself.  It’s that funny.]

One of the more tiresome aspects of public discourse outside the South is how everything relating to what is happening or has happened inside the South is, however strenuous the effort, somehow tied back to Keeping the Black Man Down.  It’s as if nothing else ever happened, and everyone bent his thoughts, hopes, and efforts solely to one objective.  I’m quite comfortable that for some people, some places, some of the time, that was true.  But then in all places, at all times, and with all large issues, there have been people who made that issue the core of their existence.  OK.  But trotting out the stick-to-beat-the-South with every time you’ve got some otherwise empty newsprint to fill up is tedious and not terribly enlightening any more.  On the other hand, if the New York Times is reduced to running articles demonstrating how beauty pageants are the most-recently discovered mechanism for perpetuating White Supremacy in the South, then surely they can’t be far from the bottom of the barrel.  What’s next, a solemn piece on “Racial Politics and Traffic Control Devices in the South, 1948-67”?

Gimme Flo King and ornate piercin’.

Recently Stilled Echos

Among my less harmful fetishes is an interest in what can generally be described as the tangible remnants things which once were but no longer are.  By way of example I find myself intrigued by the traces of old road-beds that can be discerned as I drive down modern highways.  If you see two parallel lines of trees, fifteen or twenty feet apart and meandering through a field, there’s a good likelihood you’re looking at what was once a road (it might also be a creek, but the tree lines in those cases tend not to be terribly parallel and more importantly their distance apart will fluctuate).  Old bridge abutments tacked onto bluffs and leading into nothing but air catch my eye.  As you drive down I-81 through the Shenandoah Valley there is visible along a particular stretch of it what was obviously an old railroad; you can see the embankments and there’s even the remnants of a stone-built viaduct.  For the same reason I especially recall a weekend trip the wife and I took up the Mohawk River Valley years ago.  There are scattered the old portions of the original Erie Canal, mostly stone built or, in the case of some buildings, brick.  But there they are, just out in the middle of what’s pretty much nothing.

What do I think about when contemplating them?  Mostly I think about all the people who built them, who used them.  What sorts of people were they?  Where did they come from?  Where did they live?  Where were they going, on those long-ago trips, and what must the world they travelled through have looked, sounded, and smelled like?  What would it have been like to drive down that little country lane, decades ago (and of course back then the places through which those roads went would have been even emptier than they are now), on a crisp fall day, listening to the horse’s breathing and the crunch of the wagon wheels on the rocks?  What glorious fun must it have been to lie back on the roof of an Erie Canal barge, in the bright sunshine, with the sound of the water around the bow and the creak of the tow-line leading to the horse on the path?  What did the water in the canal smell like?  Were their trips successful?  Did they get the price they needed for whatever it was they were carrying?  What concerns did those people carry with them, what hopes for the future?  When they thought in terms of, “Next year I’m going to . . . ,” what kind of a world did they imagine for themselves?

The same movements actuate in me a fascination for collections of letters and oral histories of events long past.  Another of my fetishes is the Great War, and there the two curiosities merge.  Harry Patch, who died in July, 2009, was the last living known survivor of the Western Front trenches; among other hell-holes he fought at Third Ypres.  Frank Buckles, who died in February, 2011, was the last American to have served in Europe in the Great War.  They were 111 and 110 years old, respectively. 

I recently finished reading a book, Britain’s Last Tommies, which is an update published in 2009 of a book that first came out in 2005, when there were several (a dozen or so) still living.  The compiler/editor, Richard Van Emden, has made something of a career specialty of collecting oral histories of the Great War.  The book’s got recollections by a bunch of “lasts,” including of course Patch.  Emden’s got some of the last surviving Old Contemptibles, who shipped overseas in August, 1914 (and some of whom were captured in the retreat from Mons, spending the balance of the war in prison camps).  He’s got some of the last survivors of Gallipoli (I recall reading the obituary of the last one of all, an Aussie, in The Economist several years ago).  In several places Emden (how ironic is it that someone named “Emden” would take it upon himself to preserve the last living memories of precisely British soldiers?) has gone back into the Imperial War Archives to validate, or in some cases, correct, his subjects’ memories.  What’s amazing is how few corrections there are.  I can’t recall precisely where I had lunch two days ago, and these boys are calling forth impressions from 90-odd years before.

I also have, somewhere on the shelves, several collections of letters written by soldiers of both sides during the war.  Most of the writers are enlisted, and many of them were what we’d all recognize as just ordinary guys.  They weren’t especially learned, or prosperous; in fact, quite a number of them make reference in their letters to things that clue you in that their fathers and grandfathers before them had hacked a living from coal seams and that’s what these soldiers did before the war and expected to go back to afterwards.  Quite apart from the substance of their letters is the fact of how literate they were.  Paul Fussell points out in The Great War and Modern Memory how Pilgrim’s Progress represents a cultural reference point and analytical structure across all ranks of the British army during the war.  Everyone from general officers down to the grunts splashing around on the duckboards continually phrased their impressions in terms of that work.  But Bunyan wasn’t, by far, the only specifically literary reference to be found.  Nor were the ordinary soldiers confining themselves to ready-made references.  The material is just very acutely observing, very well crafted and evocative letters.

One thing is quite certain, though:  There is no way at all you would ever get a sampling anything like it from modern Americans of any background or educational level.

Appropriately, Harry Patch appears on the cover of Britain’s Last Tommies.  Through the marvels of PhotoShop they’ve taken a silhouette of a simple soldier, laden and struggling through the mud, and reduced it to fill in the pupils of one of his eyes.  I like the image; his were the last living British eyes to have beheld the troglodyte world he survived.  If you could have shaken his hand you would have touched the hands which scooped out the soup of Flanders long ago.

And now they’re gone, all gone.  Nearly a hundred years on, have we learned anything which makes less likely a reprise of the whole blood-soaked shambles?  I think not.  Sarah Hoyt’s got an interesting post (which I’ve previously linked) on how the facile intellectuals of the 1920s, unwilling to confront the darkness within human nature — and thus within themselves — that had puked up these terrible four years, instead ascribed the tragedy to the one form of organized human existence in the world that actually stands a chance of minimizing the risk of a repeat.  And then they set about undermining, de-legitimizing that form of co-existence for the next 90 years.  We just re-elected a feller to the White House who signs up for that nonsense lock, stock, and barrel.