Doin’ It the Old Way

This time of year you can’t walk into a store to buy a box of breakfast cereal without being washed over by treacly, saccharine-laden goop, so that from Black Friday through Christmas becomes one long Santa-and-elf-ridden nightmare.

It wasn’t always this way.  Once upon a time Christmas was actually about Christmas.  Back around the early 1540s Martin Luther worked up Luke 2:8-18 into a song, “Vom Himmel hoch, da komm’ ich her,” after its opening line, spoken by the angels announcing the Good News of Christ’s birth, the arrival of the long-promised Messiah.  The link is to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s running feature this time of year on Christmas music.  Follow the link, then click on the “Audio” tab to hear how it’s supposed to sound.

As with so much else of Luther’s composition, everyone’s got in on the act since.  It’s been translated, transcribed, worked over, worked up, and generally fully explored for its musical potential.  My personal favorite was J. S. Bach’s Canonical Variations for organ, which I arranged to have played at my wedding.  Alas! the organist didn’t have the chops to play the third of the five variations (which if you listen is easily understandable; I’m given to understand it’s one of his most difficult pieces to play, a statement that upon listening I can readily accept).  But still it just rocked.  Pay attention to the pedal line throughout the variation; it’s just amazing.

The organ, by the way, on which the above is played is not just any ol’ organ; it’s a Silbermann from 1714.  The Silbermanns were a family of organ builders in southern Germany, and Gottfried was the Big Dog in that pack.  In addition to this one, the cathedral at Freiberg, he also built the instruments in the Hofkapelle and the Frauenkirche in Dresden.  Both were destroyed in the bombing, and both have been re-built (although in the Frauenkirche the re-built instrument has not only Silbermann’s original registration but also added registers so that it can play later organ music).

Here Comes the Pitch . . . and It’s a Meatball!!

So I’ll take me a li’l ol’ swing and stroke this individual up into the cheap seats. 

How ’bout that?  It’s them nasty ol’ Southern Conservative Values that’s a-bustin’ out an’ takin’ over the whole dam’ country!  It’s a good thing the author describes herself as a “social futurist,” since she’s so ham-fisted about analyzing the past or observing the present.  What makes this screed amusing is that her subtitle is in fact correct, but 180 degree out from why she thinks.

By way of self-criticism, this post is long, and because it was written in dribs and drabs over the course of a few weeks, it might be more than usually disjointed in places.  Its child-in-a-candy-store atmosphere also is a function of being in a target rich environment.  Almost everywhere one looks in Ms. Robinson’s effort one finds historical inaccuracies, mischaracterization, or simple manufactured-from-wholecloth fantasy.  Oh, where to start?

Let’s begin with the general outline of the argument: (i) There are two entirely distinct understandings of “freedom” discernible in American political and cultural tradition.  (ii) One of those understandings traces back to Good Puritan Yankee thinking and involves one’s betters joyfully guiding humanity into something sounding awfully like the charity ward of a local po’ folks home, and the other of which runs its lineage back to them whip-lashing, slave woman raping, humanity-grinding Lowcountry Plantation Lords, in which “freedom is a  zero-sum game.”  (iii) Those beneficent, far-seeing, gentle Yankees have “mostly managed to keep away from the levers of power since the Revolution” them mean, nasty Southerners.  (iv) This has changed since the New Deal when we made the mistake of building roads in the South and letting them have electricity.  (v) The entire United States, “even liberal cities like Seattle,” are “now home to the kind of local justice that used to be the hallmark of small-town Alabama sheriffs,” is run jes’ like one great big ol’ plantation, with kindly Massa easin’ down to the quarters after dark to get him some strange.

Sara Robinson, the authoress, stuffs so many fabrications and mischaracterizations into a few short pages that it’s difficult to unpack them all for a proper Fisking, but I’ll try.  Let’s work with some of the purely historical statements first.

The assertion that “since the Revolution,” the politics, culture, and economics of the U.S. were, up until the New Deal, dominated by those kindly souls in black broadcloth from New England, who “wore their wealth modestly,” would perhaps come as a surprise to Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, two-termers all, who accounted for 32 of the first 40 years of life under the Constitution (interestingly enough it was the two Adamses, who of all presidents come closest to Miss Robinson’s cartoon-like portrayal of Northeastern politicians, who both got mudholes stomped in their respective asses after a single term).  It would also come as a bit of a shock to Andrew Jackson, orphan boy from the Waxhaw Settlement (I’ll give Ms Robinson a hint: the Waxhaws weren’t Lowcountry, and not many wealthy younger sons from Barbados settled there), who so stamped his personality on an entire generation of American politics that his name has become an adjective.  Henry Clay, likewise of modest background and Kentucky power-base, who has become famous as the Great Compromiser, not once but twice brokering deals which saved the nation from splitting apart, might find Ms Robinson’s grasp of history to be less than perfect.  Her condescension might also strike the Tammany Hall operatives as being neither true nor flattering to them.  Andrew Carnegie, of slave-owning dirt poor Scottish immigrant background, who got his start in the Midwest as a bobbin boy in a textile mill, might also scratch his head at the proposition (we’ll have more to say about Carnegie later).  Whatever else they might have been, the Roosevelts were neither (a) Puritan, nor (b) of English background.  The Woodrow Wilson whom Ms Robinson cites was the selfsame fellow who was a backer of eugenics (a movement targetted above all at blacks and immigrants from Eastern Europe) and held profoundly anti-democratic views of what government power ought to be and how it ought to be exercised.  Carl Schurz, refugee from Germany and a dominant force in the U.S. Senate for years, might also look quizzical to hear himself lumped in with the Puritan tradition.

In contrast, the U.S. military, we are assured by Ms Robinson, has been under the dominance of them awful expat Barbadian Southerners for so long why we just can’t see straight any more.  Or something like that.  Grant, or Sherman, or Sheridan might all suggest otherwise.  Or Eisenhower, or Stilwell, or Chester Nimitz, whose grandfather still spoke German to him in Texas.  Or how about Ernie King, Omar Bradley, or Hyman Rickover, or Hap Arnold, or Ray Spruance, or Douglas MacArthur, or Gen. Wedemeyer, or Mark Clark?  Fleet Admiral Leahy, whom FDR called out of retirement to be his personal advisor and factotum, wasn’t of plantation culture heritage, either.  I don’t recall George Patton having a lowcountry planter’s pedigree, or Alfred Thayer Mahan.  In fact, about the only post-Civil War commander I can easily think of who does fit Ms Robinson’s bill would be George C. Marshall . . . and he (i) was Virginia, not Coastal Carolina, and (ii) became about as Eastern Establishment as they make ’em.

The pre-Civil War Supreme Court was dominated by two personalities, John Marshall and Roger Taney, both of whom were very much Southern and both of whom, especially the latter, were more than slightly solicitous of the South’s peculiar institution and how it played out in the development of legal and constitutional theory.  Years ago, when I took (at a large Midwestern university, by the way) a course in Southern history, taught by Prof. Barbara J. Fields [Aside: Black, female, and one of the most A. J. Squaredaway professors I ever came across, even back then you could tell she was what Wodehouse would call The Goods.  She did a magisterial job of getting her students to understand what a phenomenally complicated social relationship slavery was, on both ends of it.  So much of what “everyone knows” about it is either flat-out incorrect, or is a caricature of actuality.  At the time her particular area of interest was in the non-Confederate slave-holding states, which of course added an additional layer of intricacy to the politics of it.  I took her class for the same reason I later took, in Germany, a class in colonial American history:  Listening to an outsider’s good-faith contemplation of one’s world provides continuously and enduringly helpful perspectives on what one thinks one knows.  Of all the classes I’ve taken at any level, hers and that German’s courses are among the very few the specifics of which I to this day recall with profit.  I don’t know where Prof. Fields teaches now, but I sure hope she’s doing well and I also hope she’s had children.  Got to keep the gene pool up, after all.]  I recall Prof. Fields mentioning that at the time the War broke out there were several lawsuits working their way through the courts which, had they reached the Supreme Court, could easily have resulted in rulings which would have rendered toothless most of the Northern states’ prohibitions of slavery, to say nothing of the proscriptions in the territories.

What is important to remember is that the era during which Southerners (and oddly enough, with a few exceptions such as John C. Calhoun, they were not from Lowcountry Carolina) in fact did exercise not just a role but an outsized role in national politics was precisely that era in which so much of what the United States became was hammered out.  It was the era which established national over local supremacy; which established the propriety of government’s role in what was then known as “internal improvements”; which cemented a policy of westward expansionism (the nascent indutrialists of the Northeast were not much in favor of aggressive westward expansion for fear that it would deplete their labor pool); which established the office of the president as an independent political force and not merely the executive of Congressional decision; which established and solidified the Supreme Court’s role, for better or worse, in looking over the shoulders of the other two branches; which established protection of domestic industry from competition as a legitimate goal of federal policy . . . I could go on, but one gets the point.  With the exception of the issue that tore us apart — slavery — the decades in which the core dynamics of the federal union coalesced were those decades during which, because of historical anomoly, Southerners had their hands on the levers of power more than would otherwise have been the case

So much for a random sampling of personalities.  I’m sure an enormous number more could be dug up and trotted out if one had the time.  Let’s talk a bit about some of the actual levers of power.  Can you say “three-fifths clause,” or “fugitive slave act,” or the constitutional grant of an extra 20 years’ life to the international slave trade?  Can you say “nullification crisis” or “Missouri Compromise”? How about the Compromise of 1850, in which the Southern senators held up the business of the country for nine long months until they got their new fugitive slave act?  As Fergus M. Bordewich points out in America’s Great Debate, his recent history of the compromise, the fugitive slave law turned out to be the South getting what it wanted, good and hard, the draconian act radicalizing enormous swathes of the northern population for whom slavery had been until then an abstract debate about people far away.

It is quite true that, with the exception of posts which run back to the days of the Indian Wars and aviation-related bases out west, the military has built its largest installations disproportionately in the South.  That has, however, more to do with land prices, prevailing weather, and pork-barrel politics (and more to the point, it has to do with the Democrats’ courting of the boll weevils’ votes in Congress) than with any cultural leaning, one way or the other. 

Ms Robinson also does not seem to understand that until after World War II the military had such an explicitly apolitical bent that the first election Dwight Eisenhower voted in was the one in which he was elected president.  Ms Robinson also does not seem to recall (aside:  the reader will note that the foregoing phrase is an almost universally appropriate introduction to nearly any issue with Ms Robinson that one cares to mention) that with one exception the U.S. military was a culturally negligible factor until World War I.  That one exception was of course the Civil War, in which — as the reader may realize, even if Miss Robinson doesn’t — enormous numbers of people from the North and the Midwest fought in blue uniforms against a large number of guys wearing grey and butternut (or rags), who were not from the North or Midwest.  To clue Ms Robinson in on the social, ethnic, cultural, and political background of just one of those large groups (plot spoiler: their ancestors hadn’t come from Barbados, nor were they the younger sprigs of aristocratic houses back in the Olde Country), we refer her to Nothing But Victory, a history of the Army of the Tennessee.  The Grand Army of the Republic may have been a potent social and political (at least on the local level) force in the years after the war, but again, that’s certainly not a credible device for specifically Southern influence to have pervaded the army.  Came World War I and the cultural make-up of the armed forces got mutated into something it had never seen before: an enormous conscript army from literally all over the world.  The Long Way Home: An American Journey from Ellis Island to the Great War tells, through a dozen or so examples, a truly remarkable story about a generation of immigrants who became Americans in the forge of World War I.  Again, it was not at all unusual for a single division to need translators in six or ten languages, just to train the men (and of course that doesn’t include German, they and the Austrians being generally excused from service).

Now, it’s true that with the exception of the bigot Wilson, the South didn’t put up much of a show in the national political scene between the Civil War and the post-World War II era.  Oh, you had a bunch of dyed-in-the-wool racists Democrats exercising unbroken authority throughout the states of the Confederacy.  And of course you had the Ku Klux Klan taking over the State of Indiana in the 1920s.  And you had segregation either as the law or the uniform practice pretty much everywhere (Brown v. Board of Education was not a suit against the board of education of Lubbock, Texas; the balance of that case’s title is “of Topeka, Kansas”).  You had lynchings as far north as Minnesota, where if you wanted to lynch a black you really, really had to go looking for one (in fact the two I’m thinking of were rousters with a circus).

But here’s something else Ms Robinson seems to have overlooked (I know, I know: how much of a surprise can this be, with Ms Robinson?):  Until the New Deal (and again with the exception of the Great War years) there were precious few “levers of power” to be exercised at the federal level.  At all, by anyone.  Think of all the things the federal government wasn’t doing during that period:  no department of education; no block grants; until 1913 no Internal Revenue Service; no civil rights enforcement; no Americans with Disabilities Act; no selective service; no regulation of interstate pipelines; no Jones Act; no National Labor Relations Act; until 1913 no Federal Reserve; no Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; no hand-outs to every damned farmer in the country both to grow more of something and to plow under what he just grew; no Environmental Protection Act; no subsidies to Boeing, or Grumman, or Lockheed-Martin, or Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock; no Goverment General Motors; no General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs; no regulation of offshore oil drilling; no strategic petroleum reserve; no National Highway Transportation Safety Act; and on, and on, and on.  For Ms Robinson to allow that Southerners were successfully kept away from the levers of power is to assume that there were meaningful levers of power in the first place.  Until the 1930s that simply wasn’t the case.

So what was the federal government doing between the Civil War and the Great War?  Well, mostly it was doling out graft in the form of internal improvements bills (can anyone say “Central Pacific Railroad”?), taking payoffs from sundry industrialists to keep tariffs artificially high (Andrew Carnegie spent a tremendous amount of money effort and goodwill on precisely such efforts), and fighting Indians, bimetallism, and the Roman Catholic Church (I’ll give Ms Robinson a bit of an assist in guessing from what part of the country came the characterization of the Democrat Party as the party of “rum, Romanism, and rebellion”: it wasn’t Mississippi).  One thing they did have going on was the Interstate Commerce Commission, which made it its particular speciality to hook up its donors supporters by doing stuff like setting the freight rates for goods going from the North and Midwest to the South significantly lower than the rates coming out of the South.  For a huge chunk of the post-Civil War era the federal government was dealing with fallout from the Panics of 1873, 1897, and 1907 (it was that last which lead to the Federal Reserve Act being established, by the way).

The state governments were likewise doing little more than doling out patronage (“jobs for the boys!”) and graft.  Public education and temperance were always fashionable, at least in some circles.  What I found interesting was the specifically anti-Catholic impetus behind a lot of the mandatory public schooling movement.  Especially in places like New York City the growth of public education was driven by and publicly presented as a device to fight the Roman Catholic influence.  By the way, New York City was also the birthplace of a movement very much like the operations in which the juvenile Aboriginals in Australia were packed off to white families.  In NYC what they did was scoop up feral children, largely Catholic, and ship them off to Protestant families as far away as the Midwest.  The story’s told in Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898.

Now let’s take us a li’l ol’ look at them modest Puritans who wore their wealth so modestly.  You’d think Ms Robinson had never been to Newport, or up the Hudson, or wandered about the swankier parts of Boston.  You’d think she’d never heard the expression “Gilded Age,” or knew what it referred to.  You’d think she’d never heard of charming folks like J. Pierpont Morgan, who counted among his first deals a circular maneuver by which he bought rusted out muskets early in the Civil War and then sold them back to the federal government at a huge mark-up.  She’s never looked into the word “shoddy” to know that it got its current meaning from the cloth shoddy, from which those modest Northern industrialists made uniforms for Billy Yank, and which was so flimsy that it would damned near fall apart the first time it got wet.  Jay Gould, who tried to corner the gold market, likewise has eluded her radar.  Andrew Carnegie made his first money when, as a telegraph boy in his boss’ office, he acted as a straw purchaser of railroad stocks, and was faded a piece of the action.  Or how about Henry Flagler, who was John D. Rockefeller’s partner and who in the course of realizing his “modest” ambition to “ride his own iron” from New York City to Key West, Florida more or less built the Atlantic coast of that state, buying copious numbers of legislators in the process.  And let’s not forget that charitable soul, Brer Rockefeller himself, who through business ethics of the very highest caliber built up Standard Oil to be the quasi-monastic entity it turned out to be.  Hell’s bells, Ms Robinson has obviously never heard of the jingle about the weary traveller who keeps trying to find a place to rest his bones, only to be told everywhere he tries to alight to move on, that belongs to J. Pierpont Morgan.  The refrain runs:  “It’s Morgan’s; it’s Morgan’s / The great financial gorgon’s; / Get off that spot; we’re keeping it hot / That spot is reserved for Morgan.”  Among Morgan’s more “modest” purchases was the White Star Line (through his International Mercantile Marine, which had snapped up sundry other lines as well); the reader might remember one of their more famous if unfortunate liners — Titanic.  Ms Robinson appears never to have heard of the expression “too poor to paint; to proud to white-wash,” or to know where it came from (answer: Charleston, South Carolina).

Let’s look a bit more closely at the cultural heritage of the South and the Northeast, while we’re on our way through the thickets of what Ms Robinson is pleased to call her mind.  By curious happenstance I have Albion’s Seed on my bookshelves, and unlike Ms Robinson have read it, attentively.  Fisher identifies four “British folkways” which have, to a remarkable degree, pervaded the cultural patterns discernible in different parts of America.  The three we’re interested in and which he identifies are the Puritan heritage, coming largely from East Anglia, the cavalier strain, coming from southern and western England, and finally what he calls the “borderers,” who came from southern Scotland, northern England (in what had been known as simply the Marches until they were “pacified” by James I in the early 1600s), and northern Ireland (the Ulster Plantation).  Notice he does not mention any influx of Barbadians — although in fact there were quite a number of immigrants from Barbados to what became Lowcountry South Carolina.  Indeed, he identifies Barbados as being, until William Berkeley became royal governor of Virginia (before 1640) one of the preferred destinations for English immigrants.

Ms Robinson locates the gravitational center of Southern politics and society in the Barbadian-derived slave drivers, whom she places as the leading lights in an arc extending from South Carolina around the Florida peninsula to New Orleans. In doing so she plays more than a little fast and loose with time and migration (yeah: shocking, coming from her).

The colony which became South Carolina and North Carolina began as a single colony, in the latter half of the 1600s. There was in fact more than a little migration from Barbados to Carolina colony during that period, and even later. Just by way of example Judah Benjamin, the first Jew to sit in Congress (senator from Louisiana; although the son of a leading organizer of the first Reform Jewish congregation in North America, he was non-observant and married out, but never formally renounced his religion; his is a fascinating story which is made frustrating by his having burned his papers shortly before death), was born in Barbados in 1811. So Ms Robinson is correct that the influence of the West Indian sugar plantation did seep into colonial America to some degree. 

Barbados was never a very huge influence outside the Carolinas, though. According to Fisher the in-migration to Virginia, while originating in the same circles in England that the initial English settlement in Barbados had come from, did not go through that island but came directly from England. And until later on in the 17th Century a significant portion of the immigrants to Virginia were white and servile. Until the colonists figured out a way to deal with the ghastly climate of the tidewater region (mostly by moving inland, as they did when they moved the capital in 1699 from Jamestown to Williamsburg), buying a slave was a poor economic choice. Why pay fee simple for a slave who was likely to die within a few years when you could buy an indentured servant who wouldn’t outlive his indenture? And besides you got land rights when you imported the indentured servant. Once settlement moved somewhat inland that began to change. If your indentured servant survived his term of service you had to give him land, tools, or similar goods as a send-off to freedom.  Factor in Bacon’s Rebellion of the 1660s and by the last third of the century African slavery was beginning to look much more attractive to the hegemons of Virginia society. 

Georgia was a penal colony, only founded in the 1720s, and while it remained in its original form only comparatively briefly, its coastal areas were (and are) comparatively minuscule relative to its enormous back-country (it’s the largest state east of the Mississippi, by the way). Florida remained a Spanish territory until 1818. Alabama and Msissippi weren’t settled until after the War of 1812, long after any significant in-migration of wealthy Englishmen had ceased, and they were settled as much down the inland rivers as in from the coast. The Acadians who had been ejected from the French maritime colonies in Canada, and who had settled around the mouth of the Mississippi, brought an understanding of society, race, and slavery with them that differed in numerous respects from the Anglo perspective. Texas was Spanish and would remain so until the 1820s, and then remain Mexican for another decade after that. To the extent of its Anglo settlement at all, it too was settled principally overland, from the interior. It also got a hefty dose of Germans, later in the century (e.g., Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s grandfather, referred to above). The pattern is clear: The supposed dominance of the Barbadian form of society, with a tiny number of whites amidst a sea of oppressed slaves only kept in check by a deadly combination of disease, over-work, and violence, simply did not transfer to any area outside a very limited portion of a single small set of colonies. 

It is not insignificant at all that settlement of the trans-Appalachian South (what you sometimes see referred to as the Old Southwest) occurred overland and/or down the Ohio from western Pennsylvania. The reason for that significance is the fourth and last set of British folkways Fisher identifies: the Borderers. They were English, Scots, and Scots-Irish; they were Presbyterian and Anglican, with a smattering of Roman Catholic here and there. For centuries they and their ancestors had lived a life in which you could never trust the next day not to bring violence and destruction to your valley. For centuries, in fact, there was even a sub-set of law – Marcher law – which applied nowhere else outside the Marches between England and Scotland. The lords of that area were known as the Marcher lords, and they were given expanded rights and powers for precisely the reason that they were expected on both sides of the border to hold the lid on some extremely violent people. The Steel Bonnets provides a very readable history of that part of the world, in which you possessed nothing that you were not able and willing to defend at sword-point with your life. It was, in truth, a place where “life was short and death was violent.” One of my favorite vignettes is – and I can’t recall where I read it, alas – of the missionary who wandered into some border valley and inquired in the village whether they were Christians there. “Christians? Nah; we’s a’ Armstrongs.”   The Borders were a place of negligible land tenures, rack rents, poor soil, worse weather, and through everything the daily threat of violent death and destruction. You enjoyed peace only to the extent that you could be make others leave you alone by their fear of you if they didn’t. 

The Borders were “pacified” by James VI of Scotland after he succeeded Elizabeth of England. He “pacified” them principally by reducing them to a smoking ruin and killing or deporting all but a miserable remnant of the original inhabitants. Part of his Big Idea was the Ulster Plantation, a scheme whereby he’d transplant his troublesome Scots to northern Ireland to displace his troublesome Irish. And so for several generations, beginning in 1610, the Scots and the Irish mixed their language, their genes, their society, and their bad habits with each other. If James had a mind to enervate the Scots by moving them to Ireland he failed, pretty miserably. 

Whatever else the Borderers may have thought about anything in particular, their experience of organized government – of strangers who wanted them to behave in ways they did not choose themselves – was decidedly unfavorable. “Government” wasn’t something that taught your children to read, or brought you soup when you were sick, or fixed your roof when it leaked. “Government” was a bunch of men on horseback who burned the crop you were counting on to make it through the winter, pulled down your sod shack, shot, bayonetted, or hanged half the male population of your village, and hunted you out of the place where your family had lived for centuries. The Borderers’ experience of “government,” in other words, was not too dissimilar from that of the Indians’ experience of “government” (in fact, Paul Johnson in his The Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815-1830 points out the ironic tragedy that just as the destruction of the Eastern Indians’ society was concluding on this side of the Atlantic, so the Highland clearances in Scotland were wrapping up the destruction of a tribal way of life that had likewise existed for centuries on end). 

Fisher in Albion’s Seed paints a vivid picture of the Borderers as they debarked in the New World: “But even in their poverty they carried themselves with a fierce and stubborn pride that warned others to treat them with respect.” These were not the sons of planters, nor did they bring any slaves with them. They were shunted in short order to the back-country, where they spread down the spine of the Appalachians to the Carolinas and turned west, through the Cumberland Gap and othewise. The Germans, who while much smaller in number had moved in tandem with them, stopped in western Carolina (there is a reason there’s a Mecklenburg County in western North Carolina, and why congregations of Moravian Brethren are found in that area). It was the Scots-Irish who settled the Kentucky and Tennessee territories, who pushed down into Alabama and Mississippi, and who eventually continued across the river to Arkansas and Texas. When Sam Houston, born in the Shenandoah, ran away – literally – from the Tennessee governorship, he went to Arkansas to rejoin his fellow Cherokee, who had adopted him when he’d run away as a boy from home in East Tennessee; while with them he earned his nickname “Big Drunk.” Andrew Jackson’s people fetched up in back-country South Carolina. 

It was the Scots-Irish cultural background of indifferent husbandry, jealousy of outside control, and propensity for personal violence that stamped the entire Old Southwest and was then carried, through Jackson, Clay, Benton (the bullet in his shoulder that intermittently tormented Jackson to the end of his days was lodged there during a brawl with future Sen. Thos. Hart Benton and his family, conducted on the streets of Nashville) and those like them, back east to the capital. To the extent the inland South sought cultural guidance from their social betters, they looked to Virginia, not to the Carolinas. 

There is another aspect of colonial America which Ms Robinson, being innocent of history, does not seem to account for very much if at all: the Great Revivals. The first such was in 1750; the second, and even larger, was that of 1800. They were not peculiar to the South or any portion of it. The Burnt-Over District (so named because of the fires of religious fervor which swept over it so frequently) is not in the South; it’s in upstate New York. A central theme of those revivals was the notion of a personal conversion experience. It was a direct, unmediated experience of the present visitation of the Holy Spirit upon the believer. The Great Revivals were a profoundly anti-hierarchical movement. In fact the Great Revivals were for the Borderers little more than the continuation and intensification of a trend that began before they got on the ships. Fisher describes the “militant Christianity” of the People of the New Light, meeting in the open fields; he also describes the sectarian violence among them on the frontier. 

The Anglicans just never got much in the way of a toe-hold in the back-country. Charles Woodmason’s memoirs of his attempts at mission work in the Carolina back-country in the mid-1700s are just the best-known example of what must have been a depressingly widely shared experience among those who would bring established religion to the deep woods. Not only was there the whole cultural gap problem, but there just weren’t enough educated ministers for the Anglicans or even the Methodists or the main-line Presbyterian branches to make much progress. Enter the “whosoever will” philosophy of the camp meeting; cue the jack-leg preacher on his horse, riding from farm to farm. Thousands upon thousands of people would travel from all over a state to attend the larger meetings, and they would go on for days. Denominations splintered, doctrine became atomized, and congregations divided and re-divided to the point where you’ve got everything from Foot-Washing Baptists to snake-handling Pentecostals to congregations of specific denominations where it is taught that you’re going to hell not only if you aren’t of Denomination X, but you’re going to hell if you don’t attend a specific congregation of Denomination X. No kidding; I grew up among such people. 

The common element in all of this? It is a perception that personal freedom is measured by what you may not do to me. It is not, and never has been, measured by what I may do to you. Remember: If you’re like me I know good and well what you propose to do to me if I try to shove myself into your business. The two notions are just not the same thing at all. Nor is one’s value as a human driven by one’s place in a hierarchy under the conception of freedom prevalent around here. One’s place in society is driven by what one may prevent others from doing to one, by whatever means necessary. Ms Robinson may be to some extent correct about the Southern exaggerated “honor” code and the sensitivity to slights to it, but outside those specific areas it did not come from the Carolinas or Virginia. The dirt-poor Borderers brought it with them in their baggage; they wrapped it about themselves as they milled about on the quay. 

I forget which author it was, but a number of years ago someone actually began looking at real property tax records from the antebellum period. What he found was that land ownership was much more concentrated in the South than was previously realized. So where did all those people live, because there certainly were vastly more middling and poor sorts than there ever were plantation grandees. The answer is that they lived where they could, ran their cattle and hogs on such land as they could find untended, and when it was time to move on did so, abandoning the little they’d had. That model of society and economy didn’t work so well once the slave economy was destroyed. It’s been 27 years since I read it for Prof. Fields, but Steven Hahn’s The Roots of Southern Populism, a study of the political transformation of the Georgia up-country after the war, is indispensable reading to understanding how this stratum of poor whites (by the way, it was the slaves who invented the expression “white trash”; they used it to describe those whites who lived worse off than they did) which had been permitted to exist largely outside the scope of the sub-industrial plantation economy was roped into the new way of life that had to develop once slavery was destroyed. To sum it up: they didn’t like it very well. 

According to Ms Robinson, under those paragons of morality and civic virtue, i.e. the Puritans in case you hadn’t recognized them from the description, sovereignty reposed in the collective. And did it ever. Just ask Roger Williams. You’ll remember him; he was the guy who barely beat the arrest warrant when he ran away from the Massachusetts Bay colony to found Rhode Island. The Puritans were so civic minded and so conscious of sovereignty residing in the collective that they’d run your country ass out of town if you did not conform to their religion. It was in Puritan paradise that they executed witches, not in Cavalier Virginia or lash-strangled Carolina. 

I’m not here to tax the Northeastern cultural heritage. It was and is what it was and is, a charge to which we all must plead guilty. What I do object to is Ms Robinson’s holding this one cultural tradition – even assuming she’s got it read correctly, which is giving her quite a bit of leeway I’m not sure she’s entitled to claim – as being somehow more legitimately in the American tradition than the contrasting traditions of another cultural legacy. To castigate a notion of freedom as meaning the freedom from control by others, as opposed to the freedom to impose a cultural consensus of propriety on individuals, as originating in a specifically slave-based culture is both inaccurate and stupid. I object to Ms Robinson’s castigating the historical peculiarities of an entire region, which has had a vastly different historical fabric to work with, as being somehow the inevitable product of a specific cultural tradition. I object to her ahistorical comparison of one region with the historical peculiarities of other regions of the country, likewise attributed not to objective realities of their existence but to some imagined inherent moral superiority of their people. 

One example. Ms Robinson sings the praises of Northeasterners’ supposed love of schooling and specifically government-sponsored schooling, as being a product of their Puritan civic virtue (we ignore the ethnic supremacy elements of its agenda, of course). What she overlooks is that the area whose praises she sings so vigorously was settled and stable by the mid 1600s. It had established government, industry, shipping, commerce routes, and was above all compact. Much of the Old Southwest in contrast was not cleared of its aboriginal inhabitants until the 1830s, nearly two hundred years later. It was a land of deep forest, of wild rivers, of isolation. It was above all else poor, in most places desperately so. The patterns of settlement, in other words, were entirely different from those of New England, the Mid-Atlantic, or even the coastal South, to say nothing of the Midwest. What surplus wealth there was in the inland South was engrossed by the larger planters and a few industrialists or bankers in the very few cities. Get outside those few towns and there just wasn’t the money to spare for established systems of education. Sam Houston taught school for a couple of years in a one-room log school; those families who could spare a child from the fields for a few weeks a year were happy to have him, and pay him in-kind with whatever they could grow, raise, or kill. After the Civil War most of the South was economically devastated. Again, the surplus wealth that might have supported a formal education system such as existed in the Northeast, or even in the Midwest, simply did not exist. Chicago had not burned; Atlanta, Columbia, Charleston, and Richmond all did.  But to pretend that the Southern neglect of formal education that is an undeniable fact of this area’s history is some inevitable product of the alleged sensibilities and priorities of a small group of immigrants to a tiny area generations before is just dishonest, or foolish, or both. 

Finally, Ms Robinson’s attribution to a supposed slave heritage of what she conceives to be a “Southern” understanding of freedom as being a secret desire to dominate and subjugate, cloaked in fraudulent language of just being left alone, demonstrates most of all her profound ignorance of other societies’ thinking about freedom over time. Let’s look to William Blackstone and his Commentaries (I’m proud to say I have a facsimile edition of his first edition from the 1760s). “By the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is intitled to enjoy whether out of society or in it. * * * For the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that natural assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human law is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals. Such rights as are social and relative result from, and are posterior to, the formation of states and societies: so that to maintain and regulate these, is clearly a subsequent consideration. * * * The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature: being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free-will.” Oh dear; Ms Robinson, call your office. 

Perhaps, though, Blackstone’s notion of freedom somehow derived from a fundamental support for the institution of African chattel slavery? Maybe Ms Robinson gets a pass after all. Let’s see: “As to the several sorts of servants: I have formerly observed that pure and proper slavery does not, nay cannot, subsist in England; such I mean, whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and fortune of the slave. And indeed it is repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural law, that such a state should subsist any where.” Sorry, Ms Robinson, Blackstone did not derive any portion of his notion of freedom from the existence or propriety of slavery. 

By the way, we ought not forget that ancient Athens in all its democratic glory was a slave society. The miners who worked the silver mines which were a mainstay of Anthens’s prosperity were not carrying UMW cards in their pockets. Contrast Sparta, a much more tightly collectivist society (in fact, quite a bit like the Puritan ideal so burnished by Ms Robinson, in its modesty, discipline, devotion to “public service,” and firm belief that sovereignty resided in the collective). Each year Sparta formally declared war on the helots, by which device they could be killed as enemy combatants by any Spartan citizen who found it expedient to do so.

Rome likewise was a society awash in chattel slaves. I forget which personage it was (I’ve slept since I came across the line, but I have a hazy recollection that it was Pliny the Younger) who, when asked why he needed several hundred slaves, replied that it was expected of him. 

Let’s move forward in time some, to a period which Ms Robinson might reasonably be expected to have heard of. We hear from Friedrich Hayek (Austrian), first in his Road to Serfdom, about the incompatibility of collectivism with human freedom, by which he very explicitly means a freedom from the control of other persons. If Ms Robinson still can’t figure out the message, he also serves up his The Constitution of Liberty. And then we get to Milton and Rose Friedman (here’s some news, Ms Robinson: Uncle Milty ain’t from Dothan), with Free to Choose.

 I can’t help but feel it unfair to give all this air time to those people, ancient and modern, who have understood “freedom” to mean, and only to mean, your inability to bugger me around, without sharing the stage with some folks who share Ms Robinson’s notion of proper “freedom” being a not an individual condition but a collective activity, guided by one’s betters acting through the machinery of state. For starts let’s look at who else other than Ms Robinson understands the central question questions of human existence to be, “Who? Whom?” That would be Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, whom Ms Robinson might well worship as “Lenin.” “Everything within the state; nothing outside the state.” That would be, Ms Robinson, Benito Mussolini. “Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz” – the common good over the personal good – a chestnut from the pantry of the National Socialist German Workers Party. Let’s fire up the Wayback Machine and see what it spits out: Extra ecclesiam nulla salus – no salvation outside the church, coming straight to you from the Roman church of the 3rd Century. 

You know, when I look at who else shares with me that awful, eeeevvvviiillllll Southern concept of freedom, which Ms Robinson sees to her horror stalking the land, red in tooth and claw, and I compare them with the crew who espouse her version of freedom being the freedom to do as you’re told by your betters . . . . I just don’t see any reason to apologize to the Ms Robinsons of the universe. At all. Even a little. And if it really is true that Those Awful Slave Beatin’ Southerners’ concept of freedom is marching onward – which in the United States of Dear Leader’s “disposition matrix,” his domestic drone surveillance society, his use of the taxing authorities to attack his political opponents, his endorsement of what can only be described as physically violent and confrontational voter fraud, etc. I beg leave to doubt – you’re just going to have to forgive me if I don’t think that’s such a bad thing after all. 

You know, it’s a pity I haven’t more time to gut Ms Robinson just a bit more. I could go on about the Robber Barons’ supposed endorsement of Dear Leader’s statement that “at some point you’ve made enough money.” Can you imagine him saying that to Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, August Belmont, or Henry Ford? I could call up example after example of distinctly non-civic behavior (like Andrew Carnegie’s repeated pattern of committing what would land him in jail for securities fraud perpetrated on cities all over America) nearly at will. I could point out that, so far from a supposedly “Southern conservative” Weltanschauung creeping forth from the slime of blood-soaked mud to pollute and conquer the Elysian fields of Seattle, for the past 40 years it’s been people from other parts of the country flooding, simply flooding, the southern tier of states with come-heres. I could point out the massive give-aways, both political and financial, to the administration’s labor union backers, in refutation of Ms Robinson’s bleat about the supposed “rights” of the workin’ man being under assault. I could examine a bit more closely the willingness of those pure-hearted, high-minded Puritans to run their steam-powered looms with slave-grown cotton. I could sift around and find natives of the Northeast who, before the Civil War, came down south and became among slavery’s biggest champions. Like Gov. Quitman of Mississippi, originally from New York. Or I could also trot out counter-examples like the first governor of California, himself a slave-owner but who backed, for political reasons, a free-soil constitution for that state in 1850. We could take a good hard look at the cultural and political make-up of the elites of the Upper Midwest, and see how many of them are four generations or fewer removed from the fishing smacks of Norway, instead of the cane fields of Barbados. We could look up a few opportunists like Vermont-born and raised Stephen A. Douglas, who moved to Illinois and, while backing “popular sovereignty” (are you paying attention, Ms Robinson) that would permit any territority or state to adopt slavery, himself owned (through his wife) a substantial number of slaves.  But I just don’t have the time.

Oh:  Why is the U.S. now run like a “plantation”?  Ask Thos. Sowell and Alan West what happens when a black man gets off the plantation these days.

[Update 18 Dec 12:]  To borrow from Margaret Thatcher (again): I refer you to my earlier comments.  Ask Sen.-designate Tim Scott of South Carolina what it’s like when a black man wanders from the Democratic plantation.

I’ve been pecking away at this post for the better part of two weeks now, and it’s time to publish it. Ms Robinson should stick to social futurity; she’s got neither knowledge of nor talent for history. I don’t carry a brief for what happened in the South, either before or after the War. A whole lot of it is simply indefensible. So I’m not going to try. Kindly spare me, though, tripe such as Ms Robinson’s. When my understanding of freedom has amassed as many corpses as Ms Robinson’s concept of freedom has in less than a century, then we’ll talk.

Oliver Stone Suckles Stalin’s Inner Child

There has to be a name in the theory of formal logic whereby one begins by making an undeniably true, although utterly banal, statement, and then purportedly building on that statement constructs an argument which is utterly at odds with measurable reality.  Oliver Stone seems to be a master of the technique, whatever its name may be.  Stalin’s got a pretty bad rap in history.  Hitler’s a “convenient scapegoat.”  So we need “to understand their point of view.”

Years ago I watched his movie on the Kennedy assassination.  If you’re willing to suspend disbelief for the duration it makes an intriguing point.  If, however, you pay attention to all the information that wasn’t in the movie, or if it was there was soft-pedalled, the movie becomes significantly less . . . aaahhhh . . . compelling.  Like the bit about Oswald having attempted to defect to the Soviet Union and having met, while trying (unsuccessfully) to do so, with senior KGB operatives at their embassy in Mexico.  As has been pointed out elsewhere, the individuals who met with Oswald were not in the sorts of positions that one would normally expect them to have met with Joe Bloggs who just shows up at the embassy out of the blue.  Oswald had already moved to Soviet Union once, and had come back.

Now Ollie has a new movie out, in which he serves up the congealed apologias of eighty years of the Left’s love affair with Stalin.  Ron Radosh at The Weekly Standard does an excellent job of dismantling it.  The core of Stone’s fallacy?  “Failing to distinguish between democracies and totalitarian regimes, Stone consistently portrays the Soviet Union as the victim of American imperialism, while regarding the monster Stalin as a peaceful leader who sought only to gain valid security guarantees on his borders.”

I am not interested in any system of ethics, religion, or morality which cannot distinguish between, on the one hand, a political theory and practice which has very systematically extinguished 100,000,000 or so human lives in the course of less than a century, and one which has not. The Black Book of Communism, written by a group of Marxist scholars in Paris and very quickly translated into English, was the first archival examination of the question just how many people did communism slaughter during the 20th Century.  One hundred million was their best estimate, although when you’re talking numbers that large, no one will ever know even reasonably certainly.  As Oliver Stone’s idol Joe Stalin observed, when you kill a million people (it might have been “only” a hundred thousand; I haven’t looked up the exact quotation), that’s a “statistic.”

Radosh also provides us a useful reminder of just how shot through the senior U.S. government really was, not only with communists and fellow-travellers, but with actual NKVD operatives.  It really is sobering to think how close we came to having a President Wallace appointing agents of a hostile government to central positions of power and influence.

At bottom, the Left insists on seeing a moral equivalency between Western civilization and all forms of collectivism.  There is no such equivalence.  The reason that Stalin and Hitler have got such a bad press (at least from people other than Oliver Stone) is because they deserved and deserve it.  Every last bit of it.  The reason that the U.S. was portrayed as the “good guys” in the Cold War is because we were exactly that.  This is not to say that the suffering of those populations among whom it was fought out was not genuine.  But all wars produce suffering among the innocent.  The relevant questions are which wars produce the least suffering among the smallest number of people, and which wars avoid suffering among vastly greater numbers of people.  By those measures the Cold War was a tremendously successful enterprise.  It devastated populations in very specific areas, but in so doing it headed off a World War III (in which those same populations would also have been involved, by the way; it was their misfortune to be screwed no matter which way the wind blew).  Put another way, unless one is willing to say that a direct, general, unlimited military conflict between the Soviet Union and its allies and the U.S. and its allies was to be preferred to the viciousness which raged over much smaller areas of the globe, among populations much more thinly spread than, say, Western Europe, North America, or China, then I don’t see how the West’s fighting of the Cold War can be condemned.  Criticized?  Certainly.  You can always second-guess how a war was fought.  But first you must win it.

That’s Going to Leave a Mark

. . . on the face of Andrew Sullivan, proprietor of the Daily DishHe objects to Via Meadia, it seems, as he has in the past, for . . . well, this time for examining just why it is that huge slices of America do not see things the same way as the rest of the world, or even Comrade Sullivan.

The specific issue this time is why Americans by and large just do not see it as objectionable that Israel should respond to repeated and indiscriminate rocket launches from the Gaza Strip by attacking, with reasonable particularity, the specific locations, organizations, and persons whence originate those rocket attacks.  Very briefly summarized, Mead distinguishes the two theories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  The former proposes that a “just war” (just to whom? the simple reader might ask) must be fought to support a legitimate cause, such as self-defense; the latter proposes that even a war for a just cause must be fought justly — by the rules, “fair.”  A “just war” must satisfy the demands of both.

Mead traces the intellectual pedigree of jus ad bellum and jus in bello — especially the latter — to the peculiar circumstances of European history and even more so the history of European war-fighting.  Jus in bello was a notion cooked up theoretically to protect the peasants who formed the overwhelming majority of the European population from the excesses of dynastic wars.  For an informative, easily-read description of what those excesses were like to the peasants over whose homes, families, and livelihoods the armies moved, you can’t do much better than Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century.  In a pre-gunpowder age, one diminished the war-fighting capacity of one’s opponent by destroying his army if one could, and whether or not one could, by destroying his source of wealth to continue fighting (kind of like . . . the 20th Century, when you think about it).  That latter objective meant killing his peasantry, slaughtering their animals, and burning their crops.  Starving people cannot pay rent, cannot work the manorial lands, cannot bear arms.

Jus in bello, with its notion of proportional response, theoretically protected the peasantry by forbidding their destruction disproportionately to the scope and severity of the attack.  As Mead observes, why would a peasant care if the lord of the manor was the Count of Anjou or the Duke of Burgundy?  The peasant was still subject to all the delights of heriot, mortmain, boon labor, compulsory tithes, and host upon hosts upon hosts of other manorial exactions, from forbidding him to grind his grain except at the lord’s mill to forbidding him to buy wine except of the lord’s vintage.  So much the theory.

For a visual depiction of how well jus in bello worked in practice, we refer to Francisco de Goya.  His The Third of May, 1808, depicts French shooting civilians in reprisal.  From his series The Disasters of War we see graphic depictions of rape, mutilation, and prodigious death.  We think of the miles upon miles of scorched earth the Russians presented to the invading French in 1812.  Jus in bello, in other words, provided much greater protection in theory than in practice.

Hamas, al Qaeda, Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, et al. deny the right of Israel to exist as a state.  Even its self-defense is not a legitimate cause.  For that matter they by and large deny the right of Jews to live, or at least to live as Jews.  Everything Israel does in war, because it is done to further an abomination (by which is meant living Jews, either in their ancestral homeland or anywhere else, for that matter, in case you hadn’t recognized it), is by hypothesis unjust.  Israel cannot fight a just war.

As Mead points out, the bulk of Israel’s other critics shake out, or say they shake out (and one ought never to assume that the stated grounds of objection to Israel’s actions are made in good faith), on the line that Israel’s fighting of its wars of self-defense is not “proportional,” that it is not fighting by the rules.  That criticism has never obtained much traction in America.  That collective response of “Huh?” to the cry that Israel is using (literally) a howitzer to kill a fly originates in America’s experience of war, according to Mead.  In contrast to European experience of essentially dynastic conflict which as an incident produced suffering of non-combatants, Mead calls out the American experience, which is of course bereft of such warfare.  What Americans have had rich experience of is existential warfare, from the mutual efforts at extermination waged by settlers and aboriginals to Sherman’s march, to the world wars, to the great combats of the battle between socialist slavery and freedom in Korea and Vietnam.  Mead correctly points out that America’s experience of war is of clashes of entire peoples, in which conflicts the notion of playing by the rules to protect the peasantry has little meaning.  The opponent’s peasant is not just your opponent’s source of rent and fodder for his cavalry; the peasant (so to speak) as a member of the opposing people is your actual enemy by virtue of his status.

The result is that Americans as a whole place little value in playing by the rules, and from the time of the Minutemen potting at the redcoats on their way back to Boston have never done so.  We place enormous value in winning at all costs, because in a clash of peoples, the loser doesn’t just give up some territory.  The loser suffers cultural and even physical extinction.  This statement is not exaggerated; Hitler in outlining the forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union to his generals emphasized precisely the cultural and physical implications for the losers, which he erroneously supposed would turn out to be the Slavs.  As it came to pass, it was large swathes of what had been German territory for centuries which were stripped of their pre-war inhabitants, either by flight, or killing, or deportation, and which today, a scant 67 years after the shooting stopped, evidence only traces here and there of the people who had tilled the soil for generations. 

When the stakes are survival itself as a people and a culture, the duty to defend one’s people and territory is raised to an absolute.  For the reasons Mead points out, the idea of jus in bello “sails right over the heads” of most Americans because they do not see rule-abiding as a protectable value in war.  When they perceive (accurately) that Israel and its people are attacked with the stated objective of annihilating them, both politically and physically, it doesn’t strike them as objectionable that Israel does not moderate its response, that it greets low-tech pin-pricks with massive high-tech retaliation.

The first linked article of Via Meadia explains, or attempts to explain, to Andrew Sullivan the distinction between analyzing a viewpoint and endorsing it.  Sullivan appears to believe that, by engaging it on its own terms Mead endorses the American impatience with, or non-comprehension of, jus in bello.  A difficulty perceiving the difference between analysis and agreement seems to be a recurring problem for Sullivan, at least when it comes to his strictures against Walter Russell Mead.  Sullivan’s stated championship for diversity of thought and good-faith engagement with one’s opponent in same appears to shoot more than a bit wide of the mark.  In an instructive (one is tempted to borrow the Earl of Ickenham’s “pleasant and instructive”) take-down, Mead lays an open palm across Sullivan’s face which is likely to leave a bit of a mark.

And just for the record, I am firmly in the camp which recognizes Israel’s right to respond however it thinks expedient to attacks upon it, from whatever source and with whatever methods, and which likewise denies the right to quibble to those nations which sat on their hands as Hitler built his gas chambers and crematoria.  The lecturing-Israel-on-the-polite-rules-of-warfare card is one that is simply not in the deck, so far as I am concerned.

Dept. of Sic Transit

Today I got to experience two completely unrelated things, both of which served to remind me of the passage of time.

Today for lunch my father and I ate at a local chain restaurant.  We had the lunch buffet.  He paid, as he always insists on doing.  He’s also in his . . . ummmmm . . . later 70s.  I am not.  After some few minutes puttin’ down the chow, I noticed the cash register receipt.  It reflected a charge for “2 Sr Buffet”.  Now, perhaps they determine eligibility for a senior discount based on the age of the payor, and not the age of the eater.  But that scarcely makes good business sense, does it?  Granddaddy hauls in his three strapping grandsons, each one between 18 and 25 and each one a (as Mark Twain would describe them) “famine breeder,” and they’re going to let all four eat at the price of some octogenarian with poor digestion who can’t sleep at night if he eats a big lunch?  But I am holding out for the restaurant making a foolish business decision, because the alternative is that the cashier (female and somewhere in that 24 — 40 range where you really can’t tell) thought me self-evidently old enough to qualify for the senior discount.

The other thing to happen was in the quarter that formed part of the tip.  It was nice and shiny, and so I looked at it to see what state quarter it was.  It was a 2012 Hawaii quarter.  I picked it up, and in an instant I was back in 1982 East Berlin.  I still recall the feeling of incredulity, the ludicrousness, of communist currency.  You quite literally could cut through one of their 1 Mark pieces with tin snips or light-duty wire cutters.  Seriously; I tried it one one when I got back; it went easily.  Their “money” was exactly that transparently worthless.  When you went to visit the capital and showpiece of the worker’s and peasant’s paradise, they forced you to convert at least 25 good, solid Deutschmarks, for exactly 25 marks of funny money.  On neither occasion (I visited East Berlin then and then once more, in early 1986) could I manage to find anything — anything at all — that I could both spend 25 marks on and that I wanted enough to tote it home through the check-points.  That obviously fraudulent money was the symptom and symbol of the train wreck that finally ran out of steam less than a decade later.

We appear to be now just about at that point here in the U.S.  That 2012 Hawaii quarter was noticeably lighter than its mates only a year or two older.  How long before you can take a pair of wire cutters and snip a Unites States coin, sovereign currency of the mightiest power in world history, clean in two?

Well Now; Here’s Another Coincidence

On November 19, 1863, Abraham Lincoln got at least one prediction flat wrong:  “The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here . . . .”  That’s not quite how the thing worked out.  My mother has a 1953 edition of the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, which I have made her swear a solemn oath to “heir” to me (out in these parts, “heir” is a verb).  Part of why I like it is that, being from when it is, it lacks all the bilge-water tripe uttered by the sundry darlings of the lefties over the next 50-plus years; the reader is spared all the claptrap about how awful Europeans are, and how the world would be much more swell a place if only someone would put the U.S. in its place &c. &c. &c.  We’re also spared excerpts from what some speech writer put into some hack politician’s mouth, as well as similar offerings from the ghost-written memoirs of people like Dear Leader.  When you read a quotation in there from, for example, Clemenceau, you can be pretty sure that those were actually Clemenceau’s words.  And at the risk of hazarding a prediction, in 100 years Dear Leader’s legacy will still be able to stand beside the Lion’s all day and not cast a shadow.

In any event, what has always struck me about that particular book is that, by a wide margin, the longest single quotation is the Gettysburg Address, in full (it’s also unusual in that respect, although that is most likely a result of its brevity).  In terms of political thought, it’s a rather extraordinary speech.  It was of course delivered in the midst of what Lincoln described as “a great civil war” which had begun, as Lincoln himself had pointed out to I believe it was Horace Greeley, who had demanded he take positive action to end slavery, as a war specifically to save the Union, and only to save the Union.  Lincoln said as much: he would save the Union whether it meant freeing all, some, or none of the slaves.

And what Union was it Lincoln set out to save?  The Union of the Constitution.  That Union was about many things.  It was about creating a defensible polity (and people today forget just how fragile the U.S. was when the guns finally fell silent in 1783).  It was about transforming a gaggle of ex-colonies, no small number of which viewed each other with only slightly less suspicion as they did Britain, into a single polity, and making that place a single economic space.  It was about spanning the horns of simultaneously creating sufficient central power that the country could endure and not fall play-thing to predatory or just cynical European powers, and yet also so arranging the attributes of that power that its citizens could never say of it, as the motion was made (and carried, too, if I recall correctly) that the power of the crown “had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished.”  It was about trying so to create commonalities of interest that the bane of republics historically — faction — would not form, grow, and eventually swallow the nation (we haven’t falsified that proposition yet, I’d observe, and based upon the gloating about the particulars of Dear Leader’s recent electoral triumph we may not pull it off).

What that Union was not about was “equality” in any greater than an abstract sense, if that.  The three-fifths clause is only the most widely-cited example.  But the original document made no effort to guarantee any degree of uniformity of political or civil rights, beyond to say that Congress (and here I must observe how comically incorrect the judiciary has been in this respect) may not do certain things.  The original Constitution (and I do include the Bill of Rights, as it was presented for ratification so immediately) does stipulate that certain rights shall not be abridged (notice it does not say by whom), such as speech, assembly, petition, and the keeping and bearing of arms.  It also provides that right of “the people” (the same “people” as mentioned in the Second Amendment, by the way) to be secure in their persons and property from unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be diminished.  [N.b. I’ve always wanted to hear how it was that the exact same draftsmen who spoke of “the people” in the Fourth Amendment and by it meant individuals somehow used precisely the same words two amendments previously, yet really meant to say “the states, as states,” when, just a few amendments later, they demonstrate explicitly that they understood both concepts of “people”=individuals and “states”=the different political entities of the Union, and drew a plain distinction between them, when they provided that the powers not granted by the constitution to the federal government, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the people or to the states respectively.  Maybe I’m just dumb.]  There’s also no equal protection clause in the original Constitution.

So much for the Union Lincoln had said he was going to war to preserve.  He gets to Gettysburg, and in that speech holds aloft in blazing rhetoric not the dry structures of the Constitution, with its “shall be vested” and so forth, but the soaring rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence.  “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .”  You won’t find that in the Constitution.  According to Lincoln now, the nation’s very foundation was “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”  This was something new indeed.  It was something sufficiently novel to his fellow citizens, then and for generations later, that it took the Civil Rights Movement to actualize what Lincoln spoke, 149 years ago today, over a newly laid-out cemetery.

In 1887 there died a young American woman, a poet.  She was Jewish; her family had been in North America since colonial days.  This is important in light of the words for which she will forever remain known.

Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”

As mentioned, what is unusual about Emma Lazarus is that, while Jewish, her family did not come to America as part of the tired, poor, huddled masses that flooded in between the end of the Civil War and World War I, and particularly not among the hosts of Eastern European Jewry fleeing the Tsar’s pogroms and the resentments of their fellow citizens (although they weren’t fully citizens, most places) as the disruptions of industrialization turned on its ear a world that had grown stable, and brutal, and poor over centuries.

The interesting thing about Emma Lazarus’s death on November 19, 1887, and the Gettysburg Address 24 years before, on the same date, is that it was precisely the propositions enunciated in the Declaration, and which Lincoln had elevated to the very organizing principle of the U.S., that brought the tired, poor, huddled masses.  Immigration to the U.S. had always been popular, and the recent immigrants had always written back home in lyrical praise of their new country and its fecundity.  Immigrants had fled disaster before, from the general grinding poverty of the Scots-Irish to the acute catastrophe of the potato famine.  They’d come seeking religious freedom, freedom from the press-gang into the maw of the new mass armies Napoleon had bequeathed to the continent.  Many, if not most, came just to be able to own some land.  But it seems to me, from what I’ve read, that the promise of Equality, the Land of Unlimited Possibilities, as a beacon to immigrants is peculiarly a post-Civil War phenomenon.  America as the New Holy Land appears (and again, I am comfortable that there are sufficient counter-examples as to keep this well within the bounds of over-generalization) to have arisen in the minds of the common man, from the shtetl to the tenement to the peasant piling his dung heap as a consequence precisely of the Declaration’s statement of principle being placed firmly front and center in America’s self-understanding.  Is it unreasonable to wonder whether, had Lincoln not been martyred, had his every pronouncement not been elevated nearly to holy writ, that the reinterpretation of the country’s foundation which he offered 149 years ago today would have taken, and stuck?  That America’s self-understanding as a nation of poor, tired, huddled masses would have become so central to what we are about?

Have to Wonder How This Made it Past the Dissenting Opinion Suppression Committee; or, Tom Friedman Call Your Office

At the New York Times, yet even.  They actually mention what happened under their socio-economic darlings’ responsibility.  Twice in the same op-ed:  The piece is of course about the dozens of millions starved to death in the Great Leap Forward (I suppose we ought to be thankful that Dear Leader didn’t adopt that as his campaign slogan this time around), which lasted four years, but it also gives a nod to the Holodomor, in which Stalin bagged as many Ukrainians in a year and a half as Hitler picked up Jews over twelve years.  [I have to wonder if anyone in the editorial department made any observation about the NYT‘s own Walter Duranty, Stalin’s mouthpiece and white-washer, who as a NYT reporter won a never-repudiated Pulitzer for his intentional misrepresentations about Stalin’s terror famine in the Ukraine.]

The bunch who brought you the Great Leap Forward is the same ruling clique which Tom Friedman, also of the NYT, laments isn’t in charge here in the U.S.  Well, perhaps not them exactly, but he’s on multiple occasions bemoaned that the U.S., with all that messy checks-and-balances thingy, just can’t quite respond as rapidly and effectively to circumstances as specifically Red China.  He’s all for a little single-party dictatorship around the edges, if it means we can be more “efficient,” presumably in having the government take over everything it feels like. 

OK, one more time, for even the slowest-witted NYT pundits (or subscribers):  The Great Leap Forward is precisely the reason that we have checks and balances; it is Exhibit A in the seminar on why you want government policy to move slowly, and with multiple chances to be derailed.  It was, as the linked article explains, a bunch of party insiders who understood zero about the actual processes of growing things and making things who simply declared that Output Will Be Raised to X.  Their underlings then hopped to it to report that output in fact had been raised to X, which of course suggested to the insiders that they hadn’t been sufficiently ambitious, and so then they decreed 4X.  Meanwhile, back in the provinces, the regional and local apparatchiki decided that if they ever wanted to become insiders, they’d better just go ahead and make it 7X because the guys in the next province over had only gone to 6X.  And so they did, thereby prompting the insiders to move the goalposts again. 

And on the ground, there was no food.  Entire villages died out.  There’s a good story of the carnage in Jasper Becker’s Hungry Ghosts:  Mao’s Secret Famine.  As with so many other instances in which it comes time to count communism’s dead bodies, it’s hard to get a handle on how many were done to death; the 36 million figure is probably conservative.  When the Soviet Union had a census after the Holodomor, Stalin didn’t like it that the head-count was several million shy.  So he had the census bureau shot, and sent out a new team with instructions to go count again.  Got a much more acceptable result, he did.  The system Tom Friedman wishes upon us makes a state secret of the basic census numbers.

The Great Leap Forward, the Holodomor, the Holocaust, and similar but not-quite-as-deadly interludes are what happens when government works efficiently.  It very efficiently plows millions of its citizens under the turf.  The reason that government “efficiency” necessarily does this is that the very fact of “efficiency” destroys the feedback loops which serve to inform and therefore restrain private conduct.  If Ford builds a crappy car, it won’t sell.  Ford will know that it’s not selling within weeks of its launch.  It will be on the horn with every regional sales management team in the country to find out why it’s not selling.  If it can’t be made to sell, Ford will jerk it back off the market within a matter of months, and either re-design it or quietly shoot it in the head and hope no one noticed.  It will do this because if it does not, the consequences of Ford’s lousy decision-making will come back to roost with Ford.  When you have a coercive power on one side of the equation, and on the other people whose incentive structure is to mollify, not modify that coercive power, then you get bogus feedbacks.  You get the regional party chairman earnestly reporting to Peking that Whatever-the-Hell Province has increased production to 60,000 metric tons per acre of grain, which prompts Peking to figure that he’s got to be slacking off at least a little, and so we’ll just go ahead and set the “norm” at 78,000 metric tons and see how he does with that. 

In a coercive system, as all government is, you also have the decision maker insulated from the consequences of his decision.  Dear Leader’s EPA will suffer not a whit if huge areas of the U.S. power grid, dependent on coal-fired electricity generation, have to ratchet rates through the roof as the generators have to shut their turbines down because they can’t comply with ever-heightened emissions requirements.  The EPA jobs will never go away; their offices will never go dark.  If the electric-operated foundries now find their products no longer competitive, even behind tariff walls, they will shut down.  That feedback will not register in those locations where the decisions are made.

It is therefore important to realize that calls for government “efficiency” are actually calls to hand the power over and bugger the consequences.  Hayek pointed out decades ago that the essential function of the free market is to communicate information rapidly and accurately to widely dispersed decision-makers, none of whom have the capacity to know all the inputs into anyone else’s decision matrix.  Government fiat does not, cannot match either the speed of communication or the reliability.  In fact, since government regulation assumes something that cannot exist, viz. concentration at a single decisional locus of all pertinent information, you will inevitably get measurably incorrect decisions because you’re basing them on bad information.

Given the NYT‘s predilection for totalitarian systems, it’s nothing short of amazing that they printed this op-ed.  Wonder how long before it gets disappeared down some memory hole.

A Forgotten Generation

“‘Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.’  If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him?  Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away.  Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said ‘the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’

“With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.”

 So spoke Abraham Lincoln in March, 1865.

Not quite two years ago I had occasion to visit Freiburg im Breisgau, on the edge of the Black Forest, and where 27 years ago I got to spend what’s still the single most enjoyable year of my life. On those few occasions when I am able to visit Germany I always make a point to stop in for at least a day or so. Yes, I am something like a dog and his vomit in that respect. This last time I popped into the principal bookstore downtown. While studying there in the mid-1980s I did most of my shopping there. Granted, Freiburg is a university town (and has been since a couple of centuries before Columbus blundered ashore; in fact it was Martin Waldseemüller, a Freiburg cartographer, who named “America” after Brer Vespucci), but even by those standards it’s an exceedingly fine bookstore.

That visit I picked up Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, a history of the German Foreign Office during and after the Third Reich. It was commissioned by the government and published in 2006, I think, and was written by four authors collaborating. For a book ordered and written by committee, it’s a very useful read. I propose one day to blog it as well, but for the moment I want to concentrate on two books I bought for an aunt of mine. 

She’s an aunt by marriage. She and her four sisters were born in East Prussia; in fact they were so far in East Prussia that their hometown ended up in the Soviet Union after the war. And therein lies her story. Their father had already been killed on the Eastern Front, leaving the mother with four daughters, the youngest of whom cannot have been older than four or five. A very good friend of their father’s was on the staff of the commanding general in that district, and he came to their mother and told them that the war was lost, and that when the Red Army approached they were Major So-and-So’s wife and children. Understood? Sure enough, the Soviets arrived, and they all piled into the major’s staff car with his driver and adjutant. On the way to the airfield they were strafed by a Soviet fighter, killing the driver and wounding the adjutant. Edith, the oldest, once in my presence related looking back through the rear window of the staff car. The entire horizon was lined with columns of smoke and flames from burning villages and farms. 

They made it onto the last plane out of that airfield. A friend of their mother’s stayed behind. She was raped upwards of twenty times a night. At least, however, she was not shot afterward. 

The family, the youngest violently sick with a raging fever that left her largely deaf, fetched up in Denmark in the refugee camps for a number of years.  At one point they got split up. The oldest sister, who could speak English, got a job working for the Americans and met some ol’ boy from what’s still way on out in the sticks. They married and she moved here, eventually bringing after her the third sister, who met and married my father’s middle brother. I think she’s been back to her hometown once since the Wall came down; there wasn’t much left of the old place. The Soviets have done a decently thorough job of obliterating all traces of the original inhabitants. 

I’ve never heard her say much about “wie es gewesen ist” – how it was – but she’s long had a reflectiveness that seems to me at least to be several orders of magnitude more inward than one would expect, even among her generation of older Americans (one pretty much gives up looking for that trait in younger Americans, which of course makes it all the more pleasantly surprising and pleasurable when one stumbles across it). She got into transcendental meditation decades ago and that seems to have answered some need within her. 

But back to the point at t’issue, as Constable Oates might say.  Among the subjects that over the past decade or so have become less taboo in Germany is the experience of the Germans – ordinary citizens – as victims of their own war. There has since 1945 been what for a better expression I’ll call an exiles’ lobby (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten is one of the larger groups, I think), but that was always more focused on the politics of the division and the removal of ethnic Germans from what used to be the eastern provinces. They had, after all, to make room for all the Poles whom the Soviets kicked out of eastern Poland. If you imagine two entire populations ripped from their ancestral homes and shoved 100 or more miles west, that’s about what happened immediately the shooting stopped. [In the Deutsches Museum in East Berlin I recall seeing one of the placards that the Soviets just pasted around town. It allowed that within twenty-four hours all Germans were to be gone, taking with them only what they could carry in their own hands. Transportation was not arranged.] 

But the discussion, the engagement, the (and it’s a wonderful German word that captures the sense of grappling with an issue and wrestling it to the ground, there to pull it to shreds) Auseinandersetzung with the civilian German war was either swept under the rug or simply ignored. “We got through it alive somehow and that’s all we need to remember,” seems to have been the parole for the better part of 50 years. There were also enormous guilt feelings, the commonly accepted notion that how in God’s name could you talk about German war victims, with all those pits full of human ash and piles of emaciated corpses underfoot? No, better just to shut up, show up to work, bust ass all day long, save up for retirement, and keep your head down.  If you want to see how it plays out when an entire society takes to heart the divine injunction to “let the dead bury the dead,” then Germany from 1945 through the mid-1990s is a pretty good Exhibit A. 

That is changing. In that bookstore I saw two books both of which I bought for my aunt. The first and shorter is Flucht über die Ostsee – Flight over the Baltic – which is a collection of reminiscences of the refugees who were trapped in the eastern provinces when the Soviets broke through to the Baltic to the west of Danzig in early 1945.  All Prussia, Memel, Pomerania, and several other areas were cut off from the rest of the country. The government began Operation Hannibal in late January, 1945 to evacuate as much of the civilian population, war convalescents, and other mission-critical people as they could. The Wilhelm Gustloff was part of the operations, until she was sunk with anywhere up to 8,000 dead.  They had the evacuees on liners, tugboats, U-boats, freighters, anything that would float and could weather winter navigation.

Where people went to depended, of course, on where they started from. Many made their way to the Baltic shores and then down to Danzig and Gotenhafen, where they took ship for Denmark, Lübeck, Travemünde, and any other port that could berth a ship long enough to unload them. Others went straight to Danzig. It was bitterly cold, and the treks of civilians were frequently under air attack, especially while travelling over the frozen Frishes Haff (the gulf of the Vistula) to the Frische Nehrung, that long spit of land that parallels the mainland, all the way down to Danzig. Entire wagons would drop through the ice, instantly extinguishing the family and all its possessions. Or bombs and strafing would tear family members to shreds (one woman who tells her story saw both parents reduced to bloody piles of flesh by the same bomb), leaving children to depend on the charity of strangers. 

Important to remember is that by and large the only adults of able body were the mothers. The men and older boys were detained, either in the eastern districts themselves or at Danzig/Gotenhafen, not allowed to go onward. The older girls frequently were assigned to military or quasi-military support units, and so not allowed to leave. Only the decrepit and the aged males were allowed to leave. So not infrequently you’d have two or more generations of adult women, trailing multiple children (and not seldom nursing infants), and lumbered down with old men, sick and frail. 

In all, it’s a story that ought to be better known in the U.S.  Our schoolchildren will spend days learning about the Importance of This, That, or the Other Pet Constituency in the Construction of the Western Trading Posts, but they grow up in pristine ignorance of events which to this day shape the political landscape of Europe.  Don’t think that’s a problem?  Our Dear Leader chose September 17, 2009, to share in a telephone call with the Poles that we were craw-fishing on putting them beneath our missile defense shield, a shield which the Poles quite correctly understood to offer them significant protection from resurgent Russian interference.  Anyone less profoundly ignorant of history (and folks, it’s the State Department’s damned job to know these things) would have understood that day to be the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland.  For a good, if somewhat brief, look at what happened next, see Janusz Bardach’s Man is Wolf to Man.

The other book I bought my aunt is called Die Vergessene Generation – The Forgotten Generation. It is specifically about the children, and more particularly about the children who were born between roughly 1937 and roughly 1950. Their older siblings had some – not much, to be true, but at least some – seasoning under their belts by the time things got really, truly horrible for the urban German population (and the eastern rural one as well). If you were born in 1934 then you were ten by 1944, when the bombers began to have it pretty much their own way, and when the Soviets crossed the border into Germany proper the next winter. It was their younger siblings who were exposed to all the delights of industrial-scale warfare, and especially the joys of the clash of races on the Eastern Front, with no psychological defenses to speak of. 

After the war they were also the ones most likely to get lost in the emotional shuffle. “Oh, you were too young to remember,” they’d be told. Or, “Just be thankful we’re alive.” Or, “That’s just how the war was,” or “You must remember we didn’t have it all that badly.” But they did remember, in some cases with repressed recollection, but they remembered all right. Being thankful to be alive and being aware of the plight of others are intellectual responses to dealing with one’s own misfortune and emotional trauma. It’s precisely that intellectual/emotional maturity that the 1937ers and younger just did not have when they shot the works. Their war experiences pole-axed them, and after the war their parents and older siblings were too busy re-building the country to notice these seething little masses of emotional wound gazing about them, hungry, cold, and absorbing the terrible lesson that this might well be the new normal. By the time one is an adult one generally forgets how defenseless children can be, how telling a little girl that there is no room on the sledge for her favorite doll will be a memory that will still be with her when she 75 years old, and that she will instantly be able to call up the hurt and the bewilderment of that precise moment. It’s idle to dismiss that experience with the observation that surely a doll is pretty small potatoes when Marshall Zhukov’s boys are coming out of the woods: To that little girl it’s pretty big stuff; more to the point, all the hurt, the bewilderment, the awareness of being Utterly Unprotected — not by mama, not by papa, not by older brother or sister — which children that age cannot articulate, will attach themselves to that moment of I Have to Leave My Doll Behind.  The adult that child becomes may go decades before finding the words to engage, to grapple with that wounding, but the simple memory of that doll will bring all the old trauma back to the surface.

The children in the cities were also dunked, with no preparation and no internal structures to enable them to process the experiences, into the horrors of the first massive aerial war. In “Nachts schlafen die Ratten doch,” (“The Rats Sleep at Night, Though”) a short story by Wolfgang Borchert, the story is told of Jürgen, a boy of nine (significantly he’s the only person in the story with a name; the others are types). He’s lying towards sundown in his hiding place in the pile of rubble that was his home until a few nights ago.  He’s exhausted, but knows he must awaken.  He opens his eyes to see an adult regarding him.  The old man attempts to reach this child in the rubble with an offer to see his rabbits.  Jürgen can’t leave his post. Why?  Well, the teacher at school had told his class about the rats in the rubble, and how they ate whatever they could find, including the victims. And little brother is still down there, the boy says. He was only four. The boy thinks if he stands watch over what was once their home and is now his baby brother’s cairn, the rats won’t get to him. But the rats sleep at night, though, the stranger says. 

Fiction, of course, but you can jolly well be sure that little scenes only marginally less terrible played out daily, hourly, in the big industrial targets. 

Die Vergessene Generation is about those children, now in their 70s, and about their children. Many of them (not all, to be sure; even small children can have remarkable emotional recuperative capacity) have spent their lives with vague but still oppressive feelings of disjointedness, detachment from family, difficulty forming or maintaining friendships, anxieties that wash over them at odd and usually inopportune times . . . in short, all the behavioral and psychological traits of people who have something deep within them with which they’ve never made peace.  In at least some instances they’ve managed to pass along their emotional baggage to their own children.

They’re now beginning to talk, some for the first time.  Ever.  The book  intersperses discussion of the history of the (mis)diagnosis and (mal)treatment of these emotional disorders (short version: keep ’em drugged up), and how these issues fit into the larger psychological exercise of Admitting and Understanding of what Germany exactly did during those twelve awful years, with narratives of specific individuals.  One of them concerns a child of Kriegskinder (war children) who has never heard his parents speak of the war, and whose relationship with his parents has always been missing significant substance at its core.  As an adult, he finally asks his father, who explains to him that when your mother and I met and realized we would remain together, we spent an entire night telling each other everything that we experienced in the war.  We promised each other than what we said that night would never leave that room.  Ever.  It was the end of the discussion for that child.  Imagine being told that a huge — perhaps the major — portion of what makes your parents who they are (and therefore who you are) is and will always remain Forbidden Territory.

Then there’s the old woman who as a child and with her own family unable to feed all the mouths (Europe, particularly Germany, starved for well over a year after the guns fell silent) was put off onto neighboring adults, including one who more or less whored her out to pedophiles in exchange for food and cigarettes (the only current medium of exchange).

I opened this post with that quotation from Lincoln’s Second Inaugural because I think what he was trying to capture, and in a way to prepare the country for, were the same issues, the same prism through which the experiences of the war children must be viewed.  Germany gave vent to urges calling forth the worst human nature can be; that part of the world which had the ability to stop it before it exploded all over everyone failed to do so, consciously averted its eyes, buried the truth in hopes that it would not be called upon to step forward.  And the Almighty gave to the world that terrible war as the woe due those by whom the offense came.  The wealth and cultural heritage piled up by centuries of toil was blown to dust within a matter of months.  Today we study the Holocaust not to identify the perpetrators; they’re dead, mostly, and have finally been delivered over to Justice.  We study it because we need to know what lurks within us, what we are capable of doing when we loosen our grip on those parts of our heritage which trace their roots back to the Sermon on the Mount.

The war children will take to their graves the knowledge — admitted even to themselves or not — of what their parents and grandparents did.  Like it or not, that is a guilt which in fact, as one of the Nuremberg defendants allowed on the gallows, a thousand years will not erase.  And yet these deeply damaged people are just that: wounded innocence.  They are the child in Ambrose Bierce’s “Chickamauga,” wordless, uncomprehending, capable only of fear and hurt, two of the most elemental, animalistic, de-humanizing sensations which it is given us to know.  As Die Vergessene Generation makes the point:  The first step in whatever healing is possible must be permission to grieve, validation of pain felt on one’s own head.

My aunt read the book twice before she lent it back to me to read for myself.

Of Greeks, Barbarians, das Ausland, and Voting for Revenge

It appears that, 2,000-plus years after it was last politically relevant, Greece still offers us lessons to ponder.

I hadn’t picked up on this when it was first published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, back in September, but better late than never.  It’s an article about the resurgence in political discourse, particularly in Greece, of the concept of the “barbarian” as a category definition.  The “troika” that has been attempting, with in truth not much to show for it, to jerk a knot in Greece’s butt for some months now is publicly characterized as demanding “barbaric” concessions and measures.  The German finance minister Schäuble had the temerity to observe that, while Europe remains willing to support Greece, they cannot keep “pouring into a barrel with no floor.”  President Karolos Papoulias responded, “I do not accept that Herr Schäuble mocks my land; as a Greek I do not accept that.  Who is Herr Schäuble to mock Greece?  Who are the Dutch?  Who are the Finns?”  Of course President Papoulias labors under no inability to identify the peoples he references.  He knows jolly well who they are.  What he means to ask is, “Compared to Greeks, who are the Dutch to pass judgment on them?”  In doing which he grasps 2,500 years back, to a time when it mattered what Greece thought about anything.

“Barbarian” began as simply “non-Greek,” someone who did not speak Greek.  It became over time something more, an identification to distinguish between an idealized self-image and the reality of power in the ancient world.  It became, in other words, a device to bridge the gap, to reconcile the contradictions, between one’s self-assessment and the assessment passed by the balance of the world.  The world became divided into “we” and “barbarians.”  As the article points out, by the Fifth Century B.C. (note to the gentle reader: you will never catch me using that mealy-mouthed “B.C.E.” bullshit) the Greeks could point to their many accomplishments culturally, socially, artistically; they could look about and see that they were admired and copied.  But they could also see that the Persians didn’t seem to care.  They could see that the Persian tide in Asia Minor kept rising, sweeping all the wonderful Greek refinements before it.  The factual world, the world as it existed outside Greece, was not cooperating.

In the crisis of the Persian ascendancy the response was a call to unity among all Greeks to come together and defeat the barbarian hordes.  Which they actually then did, or at least to the extent of running Persia back out of Asia Minor.  And having done so, the concept of the “barbarian” as the Other settled fast in the Greek self-understanding.  The Persian army had been mindless slaves, defeated by superior Greek culture.  This gave Greece not only the ability to rule, but — and this is very important in understanding where things are, in Greece and . . . ummmmm . . . elsewhere, today — the right to rule, the right to be as they choose to be.  Being Greek became sufficient justification all by itself; it became definitionally the Good, the Just, the Desirable.

The Romans gladly adopted the concept of the “barbarian” from the Greeks (when they’d squashed Greek independence for the next 1,900-odd years).  At first, as in Greece, “barbarian” meant simply “non-Roman.”  But in the face of growing threats from outside the empire, the concept began to mutate, just as it had hundreds of years before in the Greek mind.  “Barbarian” became someone so utterly non-We that it became conceptually impossible to concede his fellow-humanity.  A “barbarian” became someone as to whom, because he was so utterly non-We that the normal moral ties to others within the circle of We no longer bound the Roman, one need not quibble with the delicacies of human intercourse.  Treaties and simpler promises became non-binding.  And as the non-We grew in power, it had to be beaten back.  Forcefully.

[I will here note that, human nature being what it is, there is more than a tinge of delight in the exegesis in a German newspaper about others who divide the world into Greeks and barbarians.  There is a noun in German, and signficantly it’s a singular noun.  It is used to refer to those areas of the world for which an English speaker, for example, would need whole expressions like “the rest of the world,” or “foreign countries,” or even “other places.”  But the German can simply refer to “das Ausland” — “the out-land.”  One either finds oneself in Germany or in the out-land.  There’s a joking story that Bavarians divide the world into Bavarians and Prussians; it doesn’t matter whether one is born in Peoria or Peking, Pretoria, Pakistan, or Pomerania: one is a Prussian.  I suppose human nature is in fact pretty much universal.]

But what do 2,500 year-old politico-cultural responses to threatened self-images have to do with us, here in the United States, todayIt has to do with hacks like Paul Krugman, and his rhetorical question of who cares what’s the matter with Kansas.  The “better,” because more anti-American, America won the election Tuesday.  Fly-over country.  The sticks.  Kansas.  These expressions are the new analogue of “barbarians,” and like barbarians, those in these areas are no longer quite fully level pegs with the more “diverse,” and “better” America.  Jas Taranto, author of the WSJ piece linked, sums it up:  “The lack of self-awareness here is something to behold. Krugman identifies a racially defined out-group, excludes it from the ‘real America,’ and declares the in-group to be a ‘better nation’ than the out-group (which is, in fact, part of the same nation). All this in the name of tolerance.”

It’s not a good thing to be a barbarian when dealing with a Greek or a Roman.  One of the things that I picked up on (well, “picked up on” is probably not the right phrase, because one “picks up on” subtle indications, and what I’m about to describe was about as subtle as Sherman’s evangelising Georgia) while attending law skool at a . . . well, let’s call it a certain northeastern skool which enjoys an extremely exalted self-image, was the underlying assumption among my classmates that they were incredibly clever (true), and thoroughly well-intentioned (also true, or at least I was and am wiling to assume that).  From those two correct proposition they proceeded to draw conclusions that scared and scare the bejesus out of me. 

Because they’re so smart and so well-intentioned, what they believe proper is not only by definition correct, but also morally right.  Because what they desire is correct and right, anything that is contrary to what they desire is wrong and wicked (“barbaric,” in the ancient learning).  Thus a dispute between them and someone who does not desire what they do is not just a disagreement over methods or goals but rather a struggle between Virtue and Iniquity.

In a struggle between Virtue and Iniquity, anything that aids the triumph of Virtue must itself be virtuous, at least to the extent employed in the aid of Virtue (thus: ballot-stuffing in, say, Texas is wicked; ballot-stuffing in Philadelphia after you’ve forcibly ejected one party’s poll watchers, so that in those precincts you have 90%+ voter turn-out with 99% voting for one party, is vox populi incarnate).  Anything that opposes Virtue, such as for example suggesting that maybe you ought to have Congress, rather than the EPA, decide to destroy coal-fired electricity generation, is by hypothesis Wicked.  In the same manner that because Marxism is an inherently liberating political system, all wars to expand Marxism are wars of liberation, so all measures necessary to put the Paul Krugmans of the world, and my classmates, in charge of everything are meet and right.

Anything necessary to ensure that my desires are not consulted or realized is therefore not merely permissible, but mandatory, because anything less would be to give aid and comfort to Iniquity.

A number of years ago (OK; it’s been almost 28 years now) I read Edmund Morgan’s American Slavery, American Freedom, a history of slavery in colonial Virginia.  The larger theme of his book is of course the paradoxical inter-relationship with the colonists’ yearning for what they understood as freedom for themselves, even as the foundation of their colony’s labor system was, remained, and had always been fundamentally un-free.  Among the subsidiary, but no less interesting things I recall about the book was the story of how the un-free labor system gradually changed from indentured servants to African slaves, and how that final and complete transition occurred much later than one would guess, and had to do with changing life expectancies of the laborers (short version: if you can’t expect a laborer to survive more than a couple or three years in the pestilential environment of tidewater Virginia, why on earth would you buy the fee simple in a slave when you could lease an indentured servant who wasn’t going to survive the term of his indenture in the first place?).  Another was how racism, or the specifically racialist characterization of the African slaves, was fostered not to support the introduction of African slavery but to justify its perpetuation.

It’s that last point that unsettles me.  It is now simply accepted discourse to attribute sub-human understanding, morality, and motives to those who do not share the leftist frames of reference common on the coasts.  Those of us who do not are barbarians, and unworthy of engagement on terms similar to what one would extend to one’s fellow humans.  We may be lied to, expropriated, and exploited to fund the Civilized Elites’ realization — or at least sufficient for them to surround themselves with a warmth-giving coccoon to seal out conflicting feedback — of their self-images.  If we are ground down; if there is no work for us; if we can no longer afford to give our children the opportunities which we ourselves had; if our temples are violated; our idols jerked from their plinths and dragged behind the Conquerors’ chariots to amuse them:  We have received no more than our due.

We should make no mistake:  Dear Leader exhorted his supporters to vote for revenge, and revenge is precisely what they mean to have.  Our very existence is an affront to their vision of themselves as the paragons of humanity.

My question is whether those of us who do not share the leftists’ opinion of themselves will so far rouse ourselves as to find our way to our own Teutoburger Forest.  Rome was ejected from across the Rhein not by the Germans’ becoming more like Romans, but by their determination that they would not become so and their unity in vindicating that determination.

November 9

Among my less annoying habits and fascinations is noting odd quirks of historical coincidence.  Like today, November 9.  Let’s take a brief wander across the arc of history as it unfolded on this date.

November 9, 1918:  Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicates, ending the Hohenzollern dynasty in Prussia and the experiment of Imperial Germany.  The empire was less than 50 years old.  Just by way of comparison, the U.S. turned 50 in 1826.  Yes, I’m aware the constitution was quite a bit younger, but the U.S. as a single polity was in fact created by the Declaration of Independence, by which the now former colonies declared themselves to be free and united.  In 1826 we were just getting into the second generation of dominant statesmen after the founders had passed from the scene.  Clay, Calhoun, and Webster were just over a decade into Congressional careers that would last until 1850 or later.  Jackson, the first president elected from outside the original states, was two years away from his first election.  So by the 50 year point the U.S. had both fundamentally changed its form of government, peacefully, and had successfully made the peaceful transition from the founding generation and its aspirations to the first generation which didn’t really have any adult recollections of anything other the United States.

November 9, 1923.  The Beer Hall Putsch is suppressed, with gunfire.  Weimar Germany had already weathered the Kapp Putsch in 1920, just barely.  It, too, involved drawn weapons.  While it survived both, each of the two left the nation weaker, not stronger.  The sentences handed out to Hitler and his henchmen were laughable, and served only to give notice that the state was unwilling to fight to preserve itself.  If the state will not so fight, why should the citizens fight for it?

November 9, 1938.  The nightmare truly begins to assume concrete outline.  Some second-tier functionary of the German embassy is shot and killed in Paris, and by nightfall the Nazi party apparatus has been mobilized to take to the streets in a “spontaneous demonstration” of outrage against the Jews.  Thousands of Jewish shops and homes are looted and burned.  Many thousands are beaten, many are killed.  The synagogues go up in flames.  The streets in the cities are so coated in shattered glass the next morning that the evening’s doings have gone down as Kristallnacht (“crystal night”).  Oh sure, the scenes in Austria in March, 1938 have been horrible enough, with Jewish noblewomen forced to crawl on their hands and knees, scrubbing the pavement with their toothbrushes, and politically undesirable people vanishing.  But Europe could kid itself that such scenes can’t always be helped when one nation is swallowed by another.  There will be aches and pains, in other words.  And of course in Munich back in September all that happened was all those Sudeten Germans were finally allowed to go “heim ins Reich,” as they’d so loudly demanded.  But Kristallnacht was different.  It was a government not merely failing to protect an entire segment of its populace; it was that government taking the lead in organizing the attacks on that populace.

November 9, 1940.  Neville Chamberlain dies.  The last man with a clear shot at stopping Hitler in his tracks, who lied and smarmed his country into a position of almost helpless exposure to the Germans, lives long enough to see himself revealed as one of history’s greatest fools and suckers.  The only reason Great Britain survived the pickle Chamberlain left it in was the geographic accident of the English Channel.  We now know that if Chamberlain had stood firm in September, 1938 the generals would have taken Hitler out.  In fact, they would have Taken Hitler Out; the plotters were staged in an apartment building a few blocks from the government headquarters, each with his assignment and armed to the teeth.  The plot was to take Hitler out directly he was caught and shoot him.  But when Chamberlain caved in he jerked the rug from beneath their feet.  Who will flock to support a bunch of renegade officers whose forces were just spared the effort of fighting by the brilliant political machinations of the Führer?  I would observe that, like all the modern American “news” organizations which have diligently squelched any story, any angle, which might reflect poorly on their own chosen Dear Leader, so also Geoffrey Dawson of The Times repeated killed stories filed by his foreign correspondents in Germany, describing in great and very accurate detail exactly what the Nazis were up to, both in terms of rearmament and in terms of political repression.  Dawson killed the stories for the express reason that he didn’t want to annoy or upset “Herr Hitler.”  He decided there were some truths which Britons were just not entitled to know.  His ideological heirs populate the U.S. media industry today.

November 9, 1989.  For the first time since August, 1961, the borders from East to West Germany are opened.  Security at the checkpoints is abandoned, and with it the 45-year monstrosity that was the German Democratic Republic, with its Stasi torture chambers, prisons, and camps, its SED, and all its odious apparatus.  The Germans don’t celebrate the event on the day, though; they won’t give the remaining neo-Nazis the gratification of surreptitiously celebrating the anniversary of Kristallnacht.

Odd coincidence, isn’t it, that so much pertinent to a single theme should have come to pass on the same day?